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REGULATORY MALFUNCTIONS IN THE DRUG PATENT ECOSYSTEM 
 
Ana Santos Rutschman* 
 
Patent protection for several of the world’s best-selling and most promising drugs—biologics—
has begun waning. Over the next few years, many other drugs in this category will lose critical 
patent protection. In principle, this should open the United States market to competition, as more 
manufacturers are now able to produce relatively cheaper versions of these expensive drugs, 
known as biosimilars. That, however, has not been the case. This Article examines this problem in 
the context of the articulation between anticompetitive behaviors and regulatory interventions in 
the biopharmaceutical arena, and argues for a novel solution: a timelier response provided by the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the form of license revocation when follow-on 
innovators fail to compete. 
 
In one significant case, the FDA approved several biosimilar versions from different 
manufacturers that would in principle compete with the biologic drug Humira—the largest-
grossing drug in the United States and worldwide—but the manufacturer of Humira entered into 
multiple agreements with biosimilar manufacturers to keep the drug out of the United States 
market until 2023, while making it available elsewhere from 2018 onwards.  
 
An abundant stream of scholarship has examined the relationship between pharmaceutical 
markets and antitrust mechanisms to curb anticompetitive behaviors. This Article moves the debate 
in a new direction. Because antitrust responses generally face a time lag, the Article posits that 
an additional regulatory intervention is needed outside antitrust law, and it argues that the FDA 
is institutionally well placed to provide a first-line checkpoint for anticompetitive agreements that 
result in non-commercialization of approved drugs. While novel, this proposal incorporates a 
solution that has been hiding in plain sight: the FDA regulatory framework allows the Agency to 
revoke licenses under certain circumstances, including some forms of inaction on the part of the 
licensee. This Article shows that the FDA not only has the authority, but also the statutory 
obligation, to revoke the licenses of biosimilar manufacturers who deliberately fail to bring their 
products to market within a reasonable period of time.  
 
Many of the biologics slated to lose patent protection in the first half of the 2020s are routinely 
used in the treatment of some of the most challenging medical conditions of our time, including 
certain cancers and auto-immune diseases. At a time when concerns over drug prices are at the 
forefront of political and social debates, finding ways to instill competition into post-patent 
markets remains a crucial task. The solution put forth in this Article furthers the interests of 
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different parties, as it clears the pathway for motivated biosimilar manufacturers to bring their 
products to a profitable market while bringing down overall costs for health systems and, in 
particular, for patients in need of extremely expensive pharmaceuticals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine a patient in need of a pharmaceutical drug with an annual price tag of $40,000–
$50,000. This drug is a biologic, a category of structurally complex drugs targeting a broad range 
of serious medical conditions, from certain cancers to inflammatory diseases such as rheumatoid 
arthritis and Crohn’s disease.1 As dozens of patents begin expiring—including the most relevant 
patent, covering the drug’s composition—competitors gear up to manufacture versions of the drug, 
which are subsequently reviewed and approved by the competent regulatory agency and may 
therefore enter the market. 
Now consider a possible bifurcation in this story. In one market, the follow-on versions2 
of the biologic become commercially available shortly after the composition patent expires. Prices 
go down by roughly 25%. In some places within this market, the savings to the patient are as 
modest as 10%, while in others they reach up to 80%, even though the latter number occurs very 
infrequently.3 Even if annual savings are on the lower end of the spectrum at 10%, our hypothetical 
patient is still spending $4,000 to $5,000 less than before patent expiration. If savings reach the 
average 25%, our patient saves between $10,000 and $12,500. In the rare scenario of an 80% 
reduction, savings can reach between $32,000 and $40,000. 
In a different market with similar economic characteristics, follow-on versions of the 
biologic are also developed, and several receive approval from the regulatory agency in charge of 
reviewing pharmaceutical products, but none comes to market. Instead, and amidst patent litigation 
concerning the secondary patents associated with the reference biologic drug, all the manufacturers 
of the follow-on products enter into agreements with the manufacturer of the biologic. All patent 
litigation comes to an end, in exchange for access to a foreign market. The manufacturers of the 
follow-on biologic start selling their product abroad under a multi-competitor regime. In the 
domestic market, with only the reference biologic available to patients, prices do not go down. In 
fact, the single manufacturer on the market promptly raises the price of the biologic after the 
expiration of the composition patent by around 10%, as it had been doing before patent expiration. 
Because each agreement lasts between four to five years, our patient will likely have no access to 
a cheaper drug for a protracted period of time, even though it is available to patients in a similar 
market. 
As the reader might have guessed, our patient is not so hypothetical. The market in which 
no competition occurs is the United States. The foreign market is Europe. The biopharmaceutical 
drug is Humira, the world’s best-selling drug since 2012. While follow-on versions of Humira—
                                                        
1 The Public Health Service Act, which regulates the approval of biologics, biosimilars and interchangeable drugs, 
defines “biological product” as “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or 
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the 
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1). 
2 Follow-on products are cheaper versions of previously approved pharmaceutical drugs, as is the case of generics. 
In the field of biologics, their follow-on counterparts are known as biosimilars. See infra, Part II. See also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 262(i)(2) and § 262(i)(3) (defining biosimilars and interchangeable products). 
3 Infra, Part III. 
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called biosimilars—have been entering the European market since 2018,4 no such thing has 
happened west of the Atlantic. The same manufacturers that commercialize biosimilars to Humira 
in Europe have agreed not to sell them in the United States,5 even though Humira’s composition 
patent expired December 31, 2016 in the United States, and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approved the first of these biosimilars in September 2016.6 Per the terms of the agreements, 
biosimilars to Humira will not be commercially available in the United States until 2023.7 In 
exchange, the manufacturer of Humira has ended all litigation—and threat thereof—involving 
Humira’s vast secondary patent estate, in which several patents have already been successfully 
challenged and invalidated by biosimilar companies.8 
Biologics like Humira consist of large, structurally complex molecules, as opposed to 
small-molecule drugs, which still form the bulk of pharmaceutical drugs available to patients.9 
They are made of living organisms10 and “produced by biotechnology methods and other cutting-
edge technologies.”11 Their complexity renders them difficult and expensive to develop, as well 
as hard to replicate.12 Importantly, many biologics are among the most promising and needed 
biopharmaceutical products around the world.13 By extension, they are also extremely pricey and 
profitable.14 While Humira and other biologics like breast cancer-treating Herceptin have a price 
tag between $50,000 and $70,000,15 a wave of newer-generation biologics recently entered the 
United States market at prices in the six and seven digits.16 
                                                        
4 See Dominic Tyer; 2018 in Review: Humira Biosimilars Arrive in Europe, PHARMAPHORUM (Dec. 20, 2018); 
Arlene Weintraub; Humira Biosimilars Catch Fire in Europe and Could Take Half the Market in a Year, 
FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 25, 2019). 
5 See Andrew Dunn, With Boehringer Settlement, AbbVie Completes Humira Sweep, BIOPHARMA DIVE (2019). 
6 AMGEN, FDA Approves Amgen's AMJEVITA™ (Adalimumab-Atto) for Treatment of Seven Inflammatory Diseases 
(Sept. 23, 2016). See also Appendix 2 (listing all FDA approvals and pay-for-delay settlements involving 
biosimilars to Humira in the United States). 
7 See e.g. Suzanne Elvidge, AbbVie Nets 7th Humira Biosimilar Deal, Pushing Pfizer Entry to 2023, BIOPHARMA 
DIVE (Dec. 5, 2018); Eric Sagonowsky, Boehringer Buckles in AbbVie Patent Fight, Saving Humira from Biosims 
Until 2023, FIERCEPHARMA (May 14, 2019). 
8 See e.g. Ned Pagliarulo, Coherus Wins Humira Patent Ruling, Chipping Away at AbbVie's Defenses, 
FIERCEPHARMA (May 17, 2017); Jan Wolfe, PTAB Sides with Boehringer in Challenge to Humira Patent, REUTERS 
(Jul. 7, 2017). 
9 See e.g. W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation 
[hereinafter Manufacturing Barriers], 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2016). 
10 See Ian Haydon, Biologics: The Pricey Drugs Transforming Medicine, The Conversation (July 26, 2017). 
11 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., What Are “Biologics?” Questions and Answers [hereinafter What Are “Biologics?”], 
(2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-
and-answers. 
12 See Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 
(2018). 
13 See generally Haydon, Biologics: The Pricey Drugs Transforming Medicine, supra note 10. See also infra, note 
355 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra, Part III.A. 
15 Infra, note 171 and accompanying text. 
16 See e.g. Denise Roland, At $2 Million, New Novartis Drug is Priciest Ever, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2019) 
(reporting FDA approval of Zolgensma, a gene therapy targeting a rare genetic condition known as spinal muscular 
atrophy). 
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Agreements between pharmaceutical companies seeking to delay market entrance of 
profitable drugs are not new. The phenomenon first appeared in the context of small-molecule 
drugs17 and became known as “reverse payment” or “pay-for-delay” settlements.18 These 
agreements first came to the attention of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2000,19 and in 
2013 the Supreme Court ruled in Actavis that pay-for-delay was subject antitrust scrutiny.20 
The trigger for these agreements is often the impending expiration of the core patent or 
patents covering a financially profitable drug. Unlike conventional drugs, which on average were 
protected by fewer than five patents,21 biologics are protected by large patent estates.22 The 
manufacturer of Humira, for instance, applied for over 200 patents in the United States, and was 
granted over 100.23 Typically, as the most relevant patents covering a drug begin expiring—or are 
invalidated—follow-on competitors start taking steps to produce and obtain FDA approval to 
market a generic version (in the case of small-molecule drugs) or a biosimilar version (in the case 
of biologics)24 of the reference product. Twice before, around 2001 and 2011, several 
pharmaceutical products faced en masse patent expirations occurring within a short period of 
time.25 This thinning out of patent protection is often referred to as a “patent cliff,” particularly 
within the pharmaceutical industry.26  
The 2001 and 2011 waves of patent expirations affected best-selling drugs like Prozac and 
Lipitor,27 whose revenue streams plummeted as soon as generic manufacturers were able to bring 
their products to market.28 Confronted with the prospect of sudden and sharply declining revenue, 
                                                        
17 This category includes drugs like aspirin, Prozac and Lipitor (a drug treating high cholesterol levels). 
18 See e.g. Carrier & Minniti, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, supra note 12 at 1. 
19 Infra, note 315. 
20 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). Infra, Part III.B. 
21 See infra, note 63 and accompanying text. 
22 Infra, Part III.A (describing how the average number of patents covering a single drug has climbed from the single 
digits to the dozens and, in some cases, to the hundreds). 
23 Infra, Part III.A (presenting a case study on the Humira). See also Appendix 1 (describing the current Humira 
patent estate). 
24 In addition to biosimilars, follow-on biologics also encompass “interchangeable products.” See 42 U.S.C. § 
262(i)(3). To date, however, no interchangeable product has gained FDA approval. See also generally Yaniv Heled, 
Follow-On Biologics Are Set Up to Fail, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 113 (2018) (describing systemic flaws in the 
regulatory pathway for the review and approval of follow-on biologics). 
25 Infra, Part I.B. 
26 As seen in Part I, thinning out of patent protection should in principle enable follow-on competitors to enter the 
market. However, gamesmanship of regulatory regimes can be used to artificially keep competitors at bay, as 
detailed in Part III. In some areas outside of legal scholarship, and particularly among industry commentators, the 
expression “patent cliff” is often used to emphasize the economic loss to patent holders brought about by the 
expiration of core patents on a drug, an emphasis not adopted here. See e.g. Elizabeth Doughman, Impending Patent 
Cliff Threatens Billions of Global Prescription Drug Sales, Pharma Processing World, 
https://www.pharmaceuticalprocessingworld.com/impending-patent-cliff-threatens-billions-of-global-prescription-
drug-sales/ (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
27 See Part I.B.1 (describing the first wave of patent expirations across the pharmaceutical industry) and Part I.B.2 
(describing the second wave). 
28 Id., ib. Notice that post-patent decline of revenue is a consequence of the mechanics of patent law, and a natural 
consequence of loss of market exclusivity. Gamesmanship of regulatory regimes, however, has enabled some 
players in the pharmaceutical patent ecosystem to artificially prolong market exclusivity by amassing abnormally 
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innovator companies began entering into pay-for-delay agreements with follow-on manufacturers, 
a scenario that is virtually identical to the hypothetical presented above, as well as to the 
agreements between the manufacturer of Humira and the biosimilar manufacturers preparing to 
take advantage of the thinning out of Humira’s patent estate. 
There is, however, an important distinction between the previous instances of temporally 
concentrated patent expirations across the pharmaceutical industry and the landscape Humira is a 
part of. The 2001 and 2011 waves of patent expirations affected small-molecule drugs. The 
ongoing wave of patent expirations is the first to affect biologics. Recall that these are not only the 
most cutting-edge products available to patients, but they also treat especially serious medical 
conditions. The social and economic impact of the ongoing wave is markedly different from 
previous waves. The consequences of pay-for-delay agreements involving biologics to the health 
of individuals and to health systems as a whole is of a much larger magnitude than before.29 
Moreover, the regulatory pathway that enables the approval and commercialization of biosimilars 
is relatively recent and, according to several commentators, poorly designed and prone to 
gaming.30 These combined characteristics should make regulators, policy makers, interest groups 
and legal commentators be particularly concerned with anticompetitive behaviors involving 
biologic products. 
Yet our hypothetical scenario is not hypothetical at all. The first manifestations of pay-for-
delay in the context of biologics occurred in 2016. Under Actavis, they should be subject to 
antitrust scrutiny.31 But it was not until 2019 that the first lawsuits were brought against the 
manufacturer of Humira and the biosimilar manufacturers potentially competing with it.32 Unless 
a legal intervention changes this landscape, there will be no biosimilar competition in the United 
States until 2023—five years after the first biosimilar to Humira entered the European market, and 
six years after that same biosimilar was approved by the FDA for commercialization in the United 
States.33 
The legal interventions associated with anticompetitive behaviors of the type described 
above belong traditionally to the domain of antitrust law and policy. However, antitrust responses 
tend to lag in time, as exemplified by the case of Humira. While pay-for-delay can be configured 
as a core antitrust problem,34 this does not mean that antitrust law and antitrust regulators are or 
should be the sole entities capable of addressing anticompetitive behaviors in the 
biopharmaceutical arena. This Article explores the possibility of a more immediate response to 
problems posed by pay-for-delay in the context of biologics than the one that antitrust regulators 
like the FTC, or the application of antitrust law, can provide.  
                                                        
large numbers of staggered patents while entering into agreements to restrict competition with generic or biosimilar 
manufacturers. Infra, Part III. 
29 Infra, Part III. 
30 See generally Heled, Follow-On Biologics Are Set Up to Fail, supra note 24. See also Carrier. 
31 See Carrier & Minniti, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, supra note 12 (providing an overview of the 
application of antitrust law to the field of biologics). 
32 Infra, Part III.A.4. 
33 Infra, Part III. 
34 See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation, infra note 372 and accompanying text. 
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Because anticompetitive behaviors related to biopharmaceutical products arise in “shared 
regulatory space,”35 it is worth asking if there are any other institutional players that are well placed 
to address pay-for-delay, without deviating from their mission and without interfering with 
unfolding, however slow, antitrust responses. 
This Article answers that question by identifying the FDA as the natural locus for an 
intervention that would curb pay-for-delay and incentivize motivated biosimilar manufacturers to 
bring their products to market. Known as an institutional catalyst for the production of information 
and as a player in the administration of innovation policy,36 the FDA acts also as the gatekeeper 
for biopharmaceutical products. In cases of pay-for-delay, a biopharmaceutical company elects to 
deliberately remain outside the market, going against the permissive gesture of the administrative 
agency approving a product at the request of that same company. 
While it is a prerogative of the private company to refrain from commercializing its 
products, it is also a prerogative of the agency to withdraw approval if no manufacturing activity 
occurs within a reasonable period of time.37 In fact, after examining the regulatory framework for 
license revocation, this Article argues that the FDA has not only the ability, but also the obligation 
to revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of pay-for-delay. 
From a policy perspective, it is also desirable that the Agency do so. This solution 
eliminates some of the most troubling effects of the extended lag between anticompetitive 
settlements and antitrust litigation, while triaging the marketplace for biosimilar competition.38 On 
the one hand, highly motivated players—in a field encompassing the most expensive drugs39 in 
the world—will seek regulatory approval from the FDA if they intend to come to market. On the 
other, players unwilling to engage in patent litigation, or motivated primarily by the prospect of 
pay-for-delay, are now discouraged from (mis)using the regulatory pathway and will reallocate 
their resources and strategic priorities accordingly. In fact, resource reallocation has already started 
to happen in the case of biosimilars to Humira: with so many biosimilars approved by the FDA 
waiting to enter the market in 2023, companies have started shifting research and development 
(R&D) funds away from biosimilars to Humira and into other types of biosimilars.40 
In addition to increasing costs for patients and health systems, the detrimental effects of 
pay-for-delay in the context of biologic-biosimilar competition are likely to extend into other areas. 
In 2018, as the number of agreements between the manufacturer of Humira and biosimilar 
companies grew progressively larger, the FDA Commissioner noted that competition-restricting 
agreements targeting biosimilars are likely to produce long-term effects and affect the incentives 
for the development of new biosimilars: 
the net result is a lopsided playing field that disincentives 
biosimilar developers from making the sizable investment in 
                                                        
35 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 
1135 (2012) (noting that “[m]any areas of regulation and administration are characterized by fragmented and 
overlapping delegations of power to administrative agencies”). 
36 Infra, Part IV. 
37 Id. 
38 Infra, Part IV.A. 
39 A field in which revenues are often measured in the billions. See infra, Part II.A. 
40 See Kelly Davio, Momenta Drops Biosimilar Adalimumab from Pipeline, CTR. BIOSIMILARS (Aug. 5, 2019) 
(describing the case of a company engaged in the development of a biosimilar to Humira that decided to halt 
ongoing R&D efforts and reallocate $100 million to the development of other biosimilars due to market saturation). 
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bringing such products to market. I am concerned this will 
lead to reduced competition in the long-run and 
unsustainable costs for these treatments.41 
But so far, neither the Agency nor commentators have considered a solution hiding in plain 
sight: license revocation, a counterpart to the FDA’s power to grant licenses, monitor the 
production and commercialization of approved products and use information generated in 
connection with these products. Because manufacturers entering into pay-for-delay agreements 
fail to generate meaningful information about their approved biosimilars, this Article argues that 
inaction due to pay-for-delay, if unjustified under certain principles,42 falls into the cases 
contemplated by law allowing the Agency to revoke market authorization.43 Moreover, the 
regulatory language is not merely enabling, but rather mandatory: the FDA “shall” revoke licenses 
for biologic products whose manufacture it cannot monitor and properly evaluate.44 The solution 
proposed in this Article is thus already embedded in the regulatory framework, needs no legislative 
intervention and does not constitute an additional burden to an administrative agency that is 
already resource-constrained.45 Applying it, however, would have an immediate and important 
effect on the availability of less expensive versions of drugs that are critical to so many patients in 
the United States. 
With several blockbuster biologics poised to start losing patent protections in years to 
come,46 finding ways to disincentivize pay-for-delay in this field becomes especially relevant. In 
arguing in favor of an FDA intervention to curb pay-for-delay, this Article does not seek to 
minimize the role and centrality of the antitrust apparatus, but rather to uncover a localized fix that 
can help in diminishing the frequency and impact of a specific type of anticompetitive agreement. 
In doing so, this Article contributes to the literature on pay-for-delay and other anticompetitive 
behaviors in the biopharmaceutical arena, as well as to the larger ongoing debate surrounding the 
limitations of long-established antitrust responses to competition issues.47 Additionally, it makes 
the case that the role of the FDA as a competition-distorting entity48 capable of providing fixes to 
intersecting regulatory problems should be further explored within the FDA-as-locus-of-incentives 
literature. Secondary contributions include a descriptive account of waves of patent expirations in 
the pharmaceutical space;49 a questioning and reframing of the licensing function of the FDA as 
                                                        
41 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Advancing Patient Care Through Competition—Speech by Scott Gottlieb (Apr. 19, 
2018). 
42 Infra, Part IV.C.2. 
43 Infra, Part IV.C.3. 
44 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1) (2018). 
45 See e.g. Leslie Pray & Sally Robinson, Addressing the FDA’s Resource Challenges, in CHALLENGES FOR THE 
FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, WORKSHOP, National Academies Press (2007), at 13 (“the FDA has been 
chronically under-funded in carrying out its responsibilities for ensuring the safety of drugs, medical devices, and 
the nation’s food supply”). 
46 Infra, Part I.B.2. 
47 See Kahn, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, infra note 373 and accompanying text. 
48 Infra, Part IV.B. 
49 Infra, Part I. 
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an administrative agency;50 and analysis of regulatory language that reveals current frameworks 
to be more capacious than previously thought.51 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the phenomenon of temporally concentrated 
expirations of patent in the pharmaceutical space and explains the relationship between drug 
patents, prices and FDA-administered market exclusivities. Part II focuses on the emergence of 
biologics at the turn of the century as the most promising and expensive drugs available to patients, 
and the corresponding regulatory pathway created in 2010 for the approval of biosimilar versions 
of these drugs. Part III explores ongoing manifestations of pay-for-delay, presenting a case study 
on Humira. It then explores the limitations of current antitrust responses to the problems posed by 
pay-for-delay, highlighting the need for cumulative regulatory interventions. Part IV argues that 
the FDA is well positioned to perform one such intervention, and that the existing license 
revocation regime should be used when biosimilar manufacturers deliberately fail to bring their 
products to market after FDA approval. While the proposal does not require any legislative 
intervention, Part IV further sketches out supplemental iterations of the proposed solution, which 
would require different forms of implementation. A brief conclusion follows, emphasizing the 
welfare-enhancing and fairness goals served by the proposal. 
 
 
I. PATENT LIFE AND DRUG PRICES 
 
A. PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND GENERIC COMPETITION  
 
Pharmaceutical innovation has long been an intersectional area. It combines two seemingly 
straightforward propositions: the discovery and development of new (or better) human drugs is a 
desirable societal and public health goal; however, the arc of pharmaceutical research and 
development (R&D) is time-consuming, resource-intensive and fraught with scientific and 
technical challenges. 
This worldview of the dynamics of pharmaceutical innovation—whether grounded on 
evidence or stemming from perceived imperatives—has become intertwined with discourses 
emphasizing the centrality of patents as drivers of pharmaceutical R&D and, ultimately, 
pharmaceutical innovation.52 William Landes and Richard Posner have famously suggested that, 
under contemporary intellectual property paradigms, certain segments of the pharmaceutical 
industry offer “the strongest case for patents.”53 Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry has 
traditionally operated under a patent-centric ethos, both through its practices and by outwardly 
portraying patents as sine qua non catalysts of drug development.54 
                                                        
50 Infra, Part IV. 
51 Infra, Part IV.C.3. 
52 See e.g. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 503, 508 
(2009) (describing the patent system as a means “to encourage socially valuable investments in R&D that firms 
would not otherwise make due to the profit-eroding effects of competition.”) See also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, at 78 (my copy) (detailing how prospect theory explains 
the role of patents in pharmaceutical R&D: “Prospect theory fits best in the pharmaceutical industry.”). 
53 See e.g. WILLIAM W. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW, HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2003), at 316. 
54 Quote from Pharma. See also See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 346 (2007) (noting that “[t]he pharmaceutical industry (…) has sung the praises 
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Arguments surrounding the centrality of patents have progressively been challenged and 
refined in scholarship and in practice,55 both generally and in the specific context of 
pharmaceuticals.56 In some—albeit limited—areas of pharmaceutical R&D, scholars have found 
evidence that patents play a modest or virtually negligible role in driving innovation.57 In a 
complementary vein, researchers have also shown that there are several other types of incentives 
that drive innovation—including pharmaceutical innovation—beyond the realm of patents,58 such 
as prizes,59 grants,60 and insurance or reimbursement schemes.61 
Even when considering the limitations of patent-focused narratives, the fact remains that 
the field of pharmaceuticals at large is characterized by innovation processes that are heavily 
reliant on patents.62 Studies have estimated that a single pharmaceutical drug is on average covered 
                                                        
of the patent system as a means of promoting costly and risky investments in research and development”); Daniel J. 
Hemel & Lisa L. Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L. J. 544, 544 (2019) (observing that the 
pharmaceutical industry is “a sector sometimes described as the poster child for the pure IP patent system”). 
55 See e.g Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Research Investments?, 9 ANN. REV. ECON., 441 (2017) 
(analyzing the effects of elements such as disclosure and prior technology on the alignment between the 
incentivizing functions of intellectual property and the social contributions generated by patenting activity); Laura 
Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV. 377 (2017) (noting the failure of 
current patent models in supporting social network innovation) Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in 
Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1098 (2013) (underlying the 
coexistence of intellectual property rights and other types of incentives, including government funding). A notable 
exception to the centrality patents in pharmaceutical R&D has been documented by Amy Kapczynski in her study of 
the network performing R&D on flu vaccines. Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: The Flu 
Network as a Case Study in Open Science, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017). See also Rachel E. Sachs, The 
Uneasy Case for Patent Law, infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
56 See Henry G. Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and Development Incentives in 
Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 302 (2015); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 54, at 593-601; Arti K. 
Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug 
Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008) (providing an early overview of collaborative modes of 
pharmaceutical R&D).  
57 See Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law, supra note 55 and accompanying text; Rachel E. 
Sachs, The Uneasy Case for Patent Law, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 499 (2018) (arguing that the ongoing development of 
microbiome-based research would not be disrupted by the removal of patent incentives). See also Kevin Outterson, 
The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 
U. PITT. L. REV. 67 (2005) (arguing that strong intellectual property rights undermine R&D focused on solving the 
problems posed by antibiotic resistance). 
58 See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?, 
2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51 (2002) (exploring incentives mechanisms beyond patents); Steven Shavell & 
Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); Hemel & 
Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, supra note 54, at 551-558 (surveying the range of patent and non-patent 
incentives potentially available to innovators). 
59 See e.g. Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003) (proposing a prize system 
that would complement or even replace the patent system). 
60 See W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2019). 
61 See Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 153 (2016); Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307 (2018). 
62 See Lisa L. Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and 
University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 303 (2010) (citing empirical literature on the 
centrality of the role of patents in pharmaceutical R&D and labeling the pharmaceutical industry “the poster child 
for a strong patent system”). Id., at 300). 
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by anywhere from 2.7 to 3.5 patents.63 In the case of structurally more complex drugs like 
biologics,64 that number can nowadays be significantly higher: for instance, Humira was at one 
point shielded from competition by more than 100 patents.65 
In enabling innovators to exclude others from the marketplace,66 the patent system gives 
rights holders the ability to price goods in monopoly-esque settings.67 There is currently no other 
area in which this ability is as debated and contested as when pharmaceutical drugs are at stake.68 
Although patents alone cannot account for concerns surrounding the price of prescription drugs in 
the United States, they undoubtedly remain the primary tool through which market exclusion 
occurs.69 
Even in a patent-dense environment such as the pharmaceutical innovation arena, there are 
in-built systemic features designed to counterbalance the anti-competitive effects of exclusivity.70 
One of the most salient is the temporary duration of patents, limited to 20 years.71 In the case of 
pharmaceutical drugs, the actual length of exclusivity has been shown to be shorter than the legal 
term, as a combination of early patenting practices and lengthy regulatory approval eat into the 
lifetime of most patents.72 
Once the term expires, competitors are in theory able to enter the market, thereby driving 
down the cost of goods. In the case of pharmaceutical drugs, market entrance may be further 
delayed if there are non-patent exclusivities at play.73 A set of statutory exclusivities prevents the 
approval of generics for certain periods of time, even if patent protection has ended. For instance, 
in cases where the original drug manufacturer has obtained FDA approval for a new chemical 
entity, the Agency is barred from approving generic applications for a period of five years, 
                                                        
63 See Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 338 (2012) (putting the number of average patents covering a single 
pharmaceutical drug at 2.7); Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug?, supra note 62, at 300 
(referencing studies using different metrics to reach an average of 3.5).  
64 Infra, Part II.A. 
65 Richard Gonzalez, CEO of AbbVie, the manufacturer of Humira, has stated that the company has been awarded 
136 Humira-related patents. See Drug Hearing Produces Few Fireworks as Slog Toward Fixes Begins, BLOOMBERG 
LAW, available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/drug-hearing-produces-few-fireworks-
as-slog-toward-fixes-begins (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). See also infra, Part III.A. 
66 Cfr. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
67 But see e.g. Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
999, (2014) (arguing that the existence of intellectual property rights cannot be equated with “uniform monopoly 
pricing and monopoly profits”). 
68 See e.g. Robert Pearl, Why Patent Protection in The Drug Industry Is Out Of Control, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2017). 
69 Other tools include additional market exclusivities granted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. See 
generally Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need 
Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012). 
70 The U.S. Constitution takes an inherently limiting approach to patent rights, which are granted “for limited times” 
and with the purpose “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
71 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2).  
72 See e.g. Erika F. Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39 (2018) (citing several studies 
exploring the length and underlying justifications for the shorter de facto period of exclusivity). 
73 See Heled, supra note 69. See also Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L. REV. 299 
(2015). See also infra, Part I.B (describing the case of the first generic drug competing with Prozac, for which there 
was a six-month period of statutory exclusivity). 
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irrespective of patent expiration.74 Similarly, when a drug manufacturer is granted approval for a 
new indication for previously approved drugs, a three-year exclusivity period applies.75 These 
exclusivities were introduced in 1984 by the Hatch-Waxman Act,76 with the purpose of providing 
original drug manufacturers with additional incentives to engage in R&D.77 In return, Hatch-
Waxman created a streamlined pathway for the approval of generics, a process that until then 
required manufacturers to conduct their own clinical trials, thereby rendering regulatory review 
too resource-intensive and expensive for would-be generic drug sponsors.78  
Even competition among generic drugs—which are by definition unpatentable versions of 
previously approved drugs—may be temporarily postponed due to FDA exclusivities. The first 
generic manufacturer to file an application for FDA approval that successfully challenges a patent 
on an approved drug is entitled to a 180-day period of exclusivity, during which other generic 
manufacturers are unable to enter the market.79 
This statutory exclusivity regime applies to most of the drugs currently on the market: 
small-molecule drugs, also known as conventional drugs, which are the product of chemical 
synthesis. Examples include aspirin, drugs used in the treatment of high cholesterol levels and 
drugs used in the treatment of hepatitis C. In addition to being small, conventional drugs are 
structurally simple, stable, easy to characterize, manufacture and to replicate. Large-molecule 
drugs, known as biologics, possess the opposite characteristics and are subject to a different 
regulatory regime, addressed in Part II. 
Released from the requirement of conducting expensive clinical trials since the mid-
1980s,80 generic manufacturers have been able to cheaply produce their versions of brand-name 
conventional drugs. In 2018 alone, the FDA approved or tentatively approved 1,021 generic 
applications.81 The Agency relies on studies estimating that generic drugs cost on average 85% 
                                                        
74 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii). 
75 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)–(iv). 
76 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). The first statutory exclusivity dates back to 1983, when 
Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act, which established a 7-year exclusivity for drugs targeting diseases that 
affect small patient populations (currently defined as 200,000 or fewer patients in the United States). Pub. Law No. 
97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in various sections of 21, 26, 35, & 42 U.S.C.). See also U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPING PRODUCTS FOR RARE DISEASES & CONDITIONS, 
https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-conditions (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
77 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 727 (framing the 
Hatch-Waxman Act as “a complex legislative compromise between the interests of research pharmaceutical firms 
and generic competitors”). 
78 Id., ib. 
79 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (laying out the 180-regulatory exclusivity); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (laying 
out the framework for the corresponding patent challenge). See also Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities, supra 
note 69, at 428-429 (explaining the generic 180-day exclusivity as an incentives mechanism). 
80 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (listing the information required for an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), the type 
of application required for generic manufacturers seeking market entrance). Since the law no longer requires a 
demonstration of safety and effectiveness, generic manufacturers are able to rely on data submitted by original drug 
sponsors instead of running their own clinical trials.  
81 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2018 OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS ANNUAL REPORT, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/2018-
office-generic-drugs-annual-report (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
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less than brand-name drugs82 and translate into significant savings to the United States healthcare 
system. Sources used by the FDA have calculated that, between 2007 and 2016, those savings have 
amounted to USD 1.67 trillion.83  
While the introduction of generics has many positive social and economic dimensions, 
from the perspective of brand-name pharmaceutical companies it marks the downturn in the 
lifetime of a drug once sheltered from competition. The Article now turns to that point in time, 
paying particular attention to the first waves of patent expirations the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
B. FIRST WAVES OF PATENT EXPIRATION: CONVENTIONAL DRUGS 
 
As seen above, even though they are relatively simple when compared to large-molecule 
drugs, conventional drugs are covered by multiple patents.84 When the main patent, or several of 
the most relevant patents,85 covering a pharmaceutical drug approach their term, that drug is said 
to be facing a patent cliff.86 The expression has become closely associated with points in time in 
which multiple drugs—and especially blockbuster drugs—simultaneously approach the end of 
patent life.87 Over the past decade, there have been three important waves of pharmaceutical patent 
expirations, which this Article addresses in the following subsections. Some commentators see the 
ongoing wave—affecting biologics—as the tail end of the second wave.88 For reasons developed 
below, among which the fact that we are currently dealing with the first wave of patent expirations 
involving biologic products, this Articles argues that the ongoing wave is best understood as a 
separate wave. 
 
1. The First Waves of Patent Expiration 
 
The first major wave of patent expirations involving pharmaceuticals dates back to 2001, 
when the generic version of Prozac entered the market.89 Prozac is a small-molecule drug used in 
                                                        
82 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERIC DRUG FACTS, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts 
(last accessed Jan. 9, 2020) (citing information provided by IMS Health Institute). 
83 Id., ib. 
84 Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug?, supra note 62, at 300. 
85 For instance, the patent covering the composition of a drug. 
86 See Charlotte Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens, 10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 12 (2011); Charlotte 
Harrison, Dangling from the Patent Ciff, 12 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 14 (2013); 
87 See e.g. Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the “Patent Cliff,” 37 U.S. PHARM. 12 
(Jun. 20, 2012) (). 
88 See e.g. Ed Silverman, Strap on Your Parachutes, Pharma Faces a Mini Patent Cliff, STAT (Apr. 26, 2017). For 
reasons developed in the following sections, among which the fact that currently we are dealing with the first wave 
of patent expirations involving biologic products, this Articles argues that the ongoing wave is best understood as a 
separate phenomenon. 
89 See Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening to Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
210, 210 (2014) (noting that “[t]he release of generic fluoxetine [an antidepressant agent for which Prozac is one of 
the brand names] in August 2001 marked the beginning of the largest patent expiration cycle in the history of the 
pharmaceutical industry”). 
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the treatment of several conditions, including depression.90 First approved by the FDA in 1987,91 
it has been described as a “breakthrough drug.”92 Until then, there were other types of 
antidepressant drugs available to patients, but they operated differently.93 Studies indicated that 
Prozac was comparatively superior to these older drugs, causing fewer and less severe side 
effects.94 It was also widely marketed as a “wonder drug”95 and quickly became a best-seller, a 
status it maintained until the turn of the century.96 
The active ingredient in Prozac, fluoxetine, was first identified as a potential antidepressant 
in the 1970s by scientists working at Eli Lilly, an Indiana-based pharmaceutical company.97 
Starting in 1974, Eli Lilly applied for several fluoxetine-related patents, which the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) granted through the mid-1980s.98 Following FDA approval, Prozac 
entered the United States market in January 1988.99 
While on patent, Prozac sales reached as high as $2.8 billion in a single year.100 It became 
the largest-grossing drug in its category, and the fifth most prescribed drug in the United States.101 
The last standing patent covering Prozac expired in August 2001,102 clearing the field for 
                                                        
90 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROZAC LABEL, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2006/018936s076lbl.pdf (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
91 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2011/018936s091lbl.pdf (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
92 David T. Wong et al., The Discovery of Fluoxetine Hydrochloride (Prozac), 4 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 
764 (2005) (describing the active component in Prozac as “widely acknowledged as a breakthrough drug for 
depression”). See also PROZAC: REVOLUTION IN A CAPSULE, N.Y. TIMES (1994), 
https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000003127845/revolution-in-a-capsule.html?playlistId=100000002148738 
(last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
93 See generally Todd M. Hillhouse & Joseph H. Porter, A Brief History of the Development of Antidepressant 
Drugs: From Monoamines to Glutamate, 23 EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1 (2015). 
94 Barry H. Guze & Michael J. Gitlin, New Antidepressants and the Treatment of Depression, 38 J. FAM. PRAC. 49 
(1994) (noting that Prozac was as effective as pre-existing drugs, but generally considered safer). But see Natalie 
Anger, Eli Lilly Facing Million-Dollar Suits on Its Antidepressant Drug Prozac, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 1990), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/16/us/health-eli-lilly-facing-million-dollar-suits-on-its-antidepressant-drug-
prozac.html (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020) (describing litigation against the manufacturer of Prozac for failure to 
properly warn consumers about the side effects of the drug). 
95 Mary O'Hara & Pamela Duncan, Why 'Big Pharma' Stopped Searching for the Next Prozac (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/jan/27/prozac-next-psychiatric-wonder-drug-research-medicine-mental-
illness (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020) (describing how Prozac was marketed as a “wonder drug”). 
96 See CLARK LAWLOR, FROM MELANCHOLIA TO PROZAC: A HISTORY OF DEPRESSION, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
(2012), at 176. 
97 Cody Wenthur, Classics in Chemical Neuroscience: Fluoxetine (Prozac), 5 AM. CHEM. SOC'Y CHEM. NEUROSCI. 
14 (2014) (noting that sales of Prozac peaked in 1998). 
98 U.S. Patent No. 4,018,895; U.S. Patent No. 4,314,081; U.S. Patent No. 4,590,213; U.S. Patent No. 4,626,549. 
99 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROZAC LABEL, supra note 90. 
100 See Wenthur, supra note 97. See also Druss, supra note 89, at 210 (reporting that Prozac averaged USD 2.7 
billion in annual sales while on patent, according to an IMS Health study on the ten best-selling drugs in the U.S. 
market by sales volume). 
101 Druss, ib.  
102 Eli Lilly sought to prevent Prozac competitors from entering the market until 2003, but the Federal Circuit held 
that the latest-expiring patent covering Prozac was invalid due to double-patenting. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, 
Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the ‘549 patent was invalid on grounds of 
obviousness with reference to the ‘895 patent); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1865 
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manufacturers of generic fluoxetine to compete with Eli Lilly. Twenty weeks after the generic 
version of Prozac entered the market, generic fluoxetine accounted for 69.6% of all fluoxetine 
prescriptions in the United States.103 Nearly three quarters of patients (73.8%) previously taking 
Prozac switched to the generic.104 A majority of new users of fluoxetine (65.8%) were started on 
the generic instead of Prozac.105 
The generic was initially priced at $1.91 per unit, 12% less than Prozac’s price per unit.106 
The price of the generic did not change for the first six months, which corresponded to the period 
of statutory exclusivity awarded to Barr Laboratories, the first manufacturer of generic 
fluoxetine.107 As exclusivity came to an end and other manufacturers were able to enter the market 
and compete with Barr Laboratories, the price of generic fluoxetine decreased significantly and 
quickly: during the year that followed the end of statutory exclusivity, it went down to $0.32 per 
unit, or a factor of six.108 Generic competition had the opposite effect on the price of Prozac: during 
the same period of time, the price per unit increased from $2.25 to $2.40.109  
Even though Prozac was priced higher than before, generic substitution sharply curtailed 
its revenue stream. By 2005, Prozac was generating $453 million in sales, down from the $2.7 
billion it was averaging while on patent.110 Referencing the moment of patent expiration in 2001, 
a commentator observed that Prozac’s manufacturer “lost US $35 million of its market value in a 
single day.”111 
In the years after Prozac began facing generic competition, other drugs used as 
antidepressants also went off-patent.112 Zoloft, a small-molecule drug manufactured by Pfizer and 
marketed in the United States since 1991, was (and is) used to treat a range of conditions that 
overlap with those targeted by Prozac.113 Although both drugs belong to the same class,114 Zoloft’s 
                                                        
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (vacating the 2000 decision, but still holding the ‘549 patent invalid on grounds of obviousness, 
now with reference to the ‘213 patent). 
103 Druss, supra note 89, at 211 (noting also that “the proportion of fluoxetine users in the population did not change 
after the introduction of the generic”). 
104 Id., ib. 
105 Id., ib. The Druss study also showed that the substitution effect was limited to Prozac, noting that only 0.9% of 
patients treated with antidepressant drugs other than Prozac switched to generic fluoxetine (“There was almost no 
evidence of switching to generic fluoxetine among patients treated with medications other than Prozac”). Id., at 213. 
106 Id., at 213. 
107 Id., ib. See also infra, Part I.A. 
108 Id., at 213-214. 
109 Id., ib. 
110 Aaron Smith, Who Stands To Gain When Zoloft Goes Generic?, CNN MONEY (Apr. 4, 2006), 
https://money.cnn.com/2006/04/04/news/companies/antidepressants/ (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). See also supra 
note 100 and accompanying text. 
111 Wenthur, supra note 97. 
112 Druss, supra note 89, at 214. 
113 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ZOLOFT, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2009/019839s070,020990s032lbl.pdf (last accessed Jan. 9, 
2020). 
114 Collectively, the drugs referenced in this section belong to the class of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, 
commonly known as SSRIs. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SELECTIVE SEROTONIN REUPTAKE INHIBITORS 
(SSRIS) INFORMATION, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/information-drug-class/selective-serotonin-reuptake-inhibitors-
ssris-information (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
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active ingredient is different from Prozac’s.115 Pfizer held two patents on Zoloft.116 While on 
patent, Zoloft generated on average over $2 billion in revenue per year.117 In 2005, the last full 
year before the patent on Zoloft’s composition expired, that number had surpassed the $3 billion 
barrier.118 As Zoloft lost patent protection119 in June 2006, the first generic version of the drug 
entered the United States market.120 Pfizer’s revenue was immediately projected to go down to 
$470 million.121 
While the pronounced decline in the sales of Prozac and Zoloft illustrates how generic 
competition leads to immediate market erosion, patent expiration does not normally extinguish the 
demand for brand-name drugs. For instance, three and a half years after losing patent protection, 
Zoloft was earning Pfizer $516 million globally.122 In 2016, that number had decreased to $304 
million.123 According to the latest available data, pertaining to 2018, Zoloft generated $298 
million.124 Prozac sales, as seen above, saw a similar downwards trajectory.125  
Globally, in the wake of the 2001 patent expiration wave, R&D on psychiatric drugs 
diminished considerably, with some studies estimating that decrease at around 70%.126 At the same 
time, the use of antidepressants went up.127 This is not to say that patent expiration and loss of 
regulatory exclusivities are the sole causes of decline in R&D in the conventional drug space. After 
a period of scientific breakthroughs and commercial growth, it has also become more difficult to 
develop new small-molecule drugs.128  
                                                        
115 Sertraline hydrochloride. 
116 U.S. Patent No. 4,536,518 (covering the drug’s composition); U.S. Patent No. 5,248,699 (covering another form 
of the drug, as well as a method of preparation). 
117 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Pfizer, 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
118 Smith, supra note 110 (putting the number at USD 3.3 billion). 
119 For the ‘518 patent, covering the drug’s composition; see supra note 116. See also Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. 
Pfizer, supra note 117 (describing the patent challenges brought by Teva prior to introduction of its generic version 
of Zoloft on the market). 
120 Smith, supra note 110. 
121 Id. 
122 PFIZER, FULL-YEAR 2009 RESULTS, https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-
detail/pfizer_reports_fourth_quarter_and_full_year_2009_results_provides_2010_financial_guidance_and_2012_fin
ancial_targets (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
123 PFIZER, FULL-YEAR 2016 RESULTS, 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/317678438/files/doc_news/2016/Q4_2016_PFE_Earnings_Press_Release_dwerfks.pdf (last 
accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
124 PFIZER, FULL-YEAR 2018 RESULTS, 
https://s21.q4cdn.com/317678438/files/doc_financials/Quarterly/2018/q4/Q4-2018-PFE-Earnings-Release.pdf (last 
accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
125 This category includes Prozac, Prozac Weekly and Eli Lilly’s own generic version of the drug used to treat 
premenstrual dysphoric disorder, Sarafem. See ELI LILLY, ANSWERS FOR SHAREHOLDERS 2004, 
https://investor.lilly.com/static-files/67d703e8-99e6-49e6-836d-4c39686df4c2 (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020), at 9. 
126 O'Hara & Duncan, supra note 95. 
127 Id., ib. 
128 Freudenheim & Petersen, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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The second wave, which began around 2011129 and affected the then-largest grossing drug 
in the world, Lipitor,130 also needs to be understood against a broader context. Several studies 
published in 2012 reported that, for the first time in over two decades, spending on prescription 
drugs in the United States had declined131 as a result of an economic downturn.132 A study by IMS 
Health calculated a decrease of 1% in nominal drug spending in the United States,133 while another, 
by Express Scripts, put that number at 1.5%.134 According to the latter study, the majority of drugs 
contributing to the 1.5% drop were “traditional prescription drugs” treating “common diseases” 
like high blood pressure.135 For drugs targeting “more complex diseases,” including oncology and 
autoimmune conditions, the same study reported an actual increase of 18.4%.136 Many of these 
complex medical conditions are now treated by large-molecule drugs, which until much more 
recently had never faced exposure to follow-on competitors. 
 
2. The New Wave of Patent Expiration  
 
Between 2016 and the mid-2020s, a significant number of commercially successful drugs 
have lost or are expected to lose patent protection. Among these, there are several small-molecule 
drugs, including Truvada, a drug used in the treatment and prevention of acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS),137 whose key patent on composition expired in 2017;138 
Lyrica, an anti-epileptic drug also used in the treatment of nerve pain (fibromyalgia),139 which lost 
                                                        
129 See Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens, supra note 86. 
130 Lipitor is a small-molecule drug used in the treatment of high cholesterol. 
131 A study by the IMS Health calculated the total of nominal drug spending in the U.S. in 2012 to have reached 
USD 325.8 billion. See Tracy Staton, Behold the Patent Cliff: U.S. Drug Market Shrinks for First Time, 
FIERCEPHARMA (May 9, 2013), https://www.fiercepharma.com/regulatory/behold-patent-cliff-u-s-drug-market-
shrinks-for-first-time (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020) (citing the IMS study, and further reporting that per capita 
spending was calculated to have dropped by 3.5%). 
132 Behold the Patent Cliff: U.S. Drug Market Shrinks for First Time, FIERCEPHARMA (May 9, 2013), 
https://www.fiercepharma.com/regulatory/behold-patent-cliff-u-s-drug-market-shrinks-for-first-time (l last accessed 
Jan. 9, 2020) (further reporting that per capita spending was calculated to have dropped by 3.5%). 
133 Id., ib. 
134 EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2012 DRUG TREND REPORT (Mar. 5, 2013), https://lab.express-
scripts.com/lab/insights/industry-updates/2012-drug-trend-report (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). See also generally 
EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2012 EXPRESS SCRIPTS DRUG TREND REPORT (on file with author). 
135 EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2012 DRUG TREND REPORT, supra note 134. 
136 Id. 
137 Trudy Ring, FDA Approves Generic Version of Truvada, HIV PLUS (Jun. 20, 2018) (also noting Truvada cost 
$1,500 per month while on-patent). Also nod to patent government episode. 
138 The patent covering tenofovir disoproxil fumarate expired in July 2017. Another patent on Truvada’s 
composition, covering emtricitabine, was the source of much… https://www.pharmacytimes.com/resource-
centers/hiv/truvada-commercial-during-rent-live-sparks-dialogue-about-prep-accessibility. 
139 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEDICATION GUIDE: LYRICA, https://www.fda.gov/media/76602/download. 
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patent protection in 2019;140 and Tecfidera, used in the treatment of relapsing multiple sclerosis,141 
which is losing key patents in 2019 and currently faces a patent challenge that could allow for 
generic competition as early as 2020.142  
Before losing patent protection, Truvada generated up to $2.6 billion per year in sales in 
the United States.143 Lyrica averaged sales in excess of $3 billion in the United States in the years 
prior to patent expiration,144 while Tecfidera averaged $4 billion.145 As in previous instances of 
patent expirations, as manufacturers of generics are allowed to enter the market, revenues 
associated with these drugs are projected to decline.146 
Given the proximity between the tail end of the 2011 wave and the ongoing loss of patent 
and exclusivity protection affecting several blockbuster drugs, some commentators see a 
continuity between the second wave and the ongoing one.147 The wave that began in 2016, 
however, is significantly different from previous ones, as it includes for the first time the larger, 
more complex drugs known as biologics.148 This Article thus treats the 2016 wave separately, not 
only materially, but also because it takes the view that the legal and policy problems posed by 
competition involving biologic drugs should be addressed in significantly different ways from the 
ones adopted in connection with the 2001 and 2011 waves.149 The characteristics of biologics and 
the challenges related to biologic competition are addressed, respectively, in Parts II and III. 
Among the biologics losing patent protection during the current wave is the largest-
grossing drug (of any kind) in the world, Humira, which is the subject of a case study in Part III. 
Several other blockbuster biologics will face the loss of total or partial patent protection during the 
ongoing wave. These include Rituxan, used in the treatment of some cancers and rheumatoid 
arthritis, among other indications,150 whose patent estate began expiring in 2018;151 Herceptin, 
                                                        
140 Eric Sagonowsky, Pfizer Wins Blockbuster Lyrica Patent Extension to Safeguard Sales till June, FIERCEPHARMA 
(Nov. 28, 2018) (describing how Lyrica enjoyed patent protection until the end of 2018, followed by regulatory 
exclusivity through the end of June 2019).  
141 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVAL PACKAGE (TECFIDERA), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2014/204063Orig1s010.pdf. 
142 Eric Sagonowsky, Biogen Faces Multibillion-Dollar Tecfidera Loss if Mylan Wins Latest Patent Threat, 
FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 7, 2019). 
143 Id., Gilead's $3B Truvada Will Face Generics a Year Early. Can Descovy Still Win Over Its Patients?, 
FIERCEPHARMA (May 9, 2019) (additionally reporting worldwide sales of Truvada reaching $3 billion in 2018). 
144 Kyle Blankenship, Truvada, FIERCEPHARMA (Jun. 17, 2019) (citing $3.59 billion for 2018). 
145 Biogen Reports Record Revenues for Both the Full Year and Fourth Quarter of 2017, $12.3 Billion and $3.3 
Billion, Respectively, BUSINESS WIRE (Jan. 25, 2018). See also Jonathan Gardner, After Alzheimer’s Collapse, 
Biogen Must Win Tecfidera Patent Challenge, EVALUATE (Mar. 25, 2019). 
146 See e.g. Phil Taylor, As Lyrica Patent Expiry Looms, Pfizer Buys Array for $11.4bn, PHARMAPHORUM (Jun. 17, 
2019) (describing the expected impact of generic competition on Lyrica sales). 
147 Silverman, Strap on Your Parachutes, supra note 88 (quoting an industry analyst stating that “[i]t may be 
incorrect to claim that the [2011]‘patent cliff’ has passed”). 
148 Id., ib. (acknowledging that biologic drugs are facing a so-called “patent cliff” for the first time). 
149 See infra, Parts IV.B and V (arguing that reliance on antitrust tools should be complemented by a stricter 
approach to the FDA’s power to grant licenses covering pharmaceutical drugs). 
150 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (RITUXAN), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/103705s5367s5388lbl.pdf. 
151 Roche's Blockbuster Oncology Drugs Losing Steam as They Approach Patent Expiry, Forbes (Oct. 12, 2017). 
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widely used in the treatment of breast cancer,152 which lost patent protection in the U.S. in 2019;153 
and Avastin, an oncology drug that is also used in the treatment of eye disease,154 which also lost 
patent protection in the United States in 2019 and is set to lose protection in Europe in 2022.155  
While on patent, these three biologics were among the best-selling drugs domestically and 
abroad. During the last year of full patent protection, Herceptin and Avastin generated $2.5 billion 
and $3 billion, respectively, in the United States market.156 Rituxan, exposed earlier to 
competition, had sales declining from $7.32 billion in 2015157 to $4.92 billion in 2018,158 and is 
predicted to endure further erosion as competitors enter the market.159 
 
 
II. BIOLOGICS AND PATENT TERM EXPIRATION 
 
A. BIOLOGICS: “THE MOST PROMISING DRUGS” 
 
Biologics are large-molecule drugs made of living materials.160 Their structure is so 
complex that they have been contrasted with conventional drugs in the following way: “if an 
aspirin were a bicycle, a small biologic would be a Toyota Prius, and a large biologic would be an 
F-16 fighter jet.”161  
Unlike small-molecule drugs, which are chemically synthesized, biologics are also difficult 
to characterize and sensitive to manufacturing changes.162 In addition to rendering them costly to 
develop, this makes biologics very hard to replicate in sharp contrast with conventional drugs, 
which are easily reverse-engineered.163  
At the same time, biologics are widely considered among the “most promising”164 drugs 
available to patients today.165 They are currently used to treat a wide array of diseases, from several 
                                                        
152 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (HERCEPTIN), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2010/103792s5250lbl.pdf. 
153 FDA Approves Herceptin Biosimilar as U.S. Patent Expires, PHARMAPHORUM (Jun. 14, 2019). 
154 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (AVASTIN), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2014/125085s301lbl.pdf. 
155 FDA Approves Bevacizumab Biosimilar Mvasi, GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (2017). 
156 Amy Brown, Roche Dominates 2019’s Big Patent Expiries, EVALUATE (Jan 21., 2019) (reporting revenue from 
2018). As of late 2018, Herceptin and Avastin had generated $43.1 billion and $49.4 billion, respectively, in lifetime 
sales. Id. 
157 Michael Gibney, Rituxan, FIERCEPHARMA (2016). 
158 Eric Saganowski, Rituxan, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 26, 2019). 
159 Id. 
160 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
161 Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 9, at 1026. 
162 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., What Are “Biologics”, supra note 11, at 1026. 
163 See Henry G. Grabowski et al., Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
439 (2007); see also DAN L. BURK & MARK LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS, at 39. 
164 Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note 9, at 1026. 
165 U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 
(2009) (report available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-
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types of cancer to common inflammatory diseases including lupus, rheumatoid arthritis and 
Crohn’s. They are also among the most expensive drugs in the market. Herceptin, one of the 
biologics that lost patent protection in 2019,166 cost $54,000 per year in 2012167 and as much as 
$70,000 in 2016.168 The anti-rheumatoid Humira, which has been the world’s best-selling drug for 
several years, costs up to $50,000 a year in the United States,169 even though several critical patents 
on the drug have expired.170 Over the last few years, very promising gene therapies approved by 
the FDA were (at least initially) priced in the high six digits.171 And very recently, Zolgensma,172 
a gene therapy targeting a rare form of muscular atrophy, broke the $2 million barrier.173 
While biologic products have been on the market since the mid-1980s,174 when the FDA 
approved the first therapeutic monoclonal antibody,175 the boom in the commercialization of 
biologics–especially the more complex ones—did not take place until the turn of the century.176 
Rituxan, Herceptin and Avastin, three of the leading oncology drugs losing patent protection, were 
approved in 1997, 1998 and 2004, respectively. These are among the increasing number of 
biologics now approaching the end of their patent life or exclusivity period, or both. 
Throughout the 2000s, biologics entering the United States market faced virtually no 
competition. As described in Part I, a regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions of 
                                                        
follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf); Bahija Jallal, 
Realizing the Promise of Biologics, HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. (Apr. 9, 2017). 
166 Supra, Part I. 
167 See Tracy Staton, FDA Approves Roche's Pricey New Herceptin Partner, Perjeta, FIERCEPHARMA (Jun 11, 2012) 
(citing a monthly cost of $4,500). 
168 See Ed Silverman, Genentech Accused Again of Cheating Health Care Providers, STAT (Mar. 20, 2016). 
169 See Andrew Pollack, Makers of Humira and Enbrel Using New Drug Patents to Delay Generic Versions, NY 
TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016). 
170 Infra, Part III.A. 
171 See Emily Mulin, Tracking the Cost of Gene Therapy, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017) (listing price tags 
between $373,000 and $1 million the gene therapies commercialized under the brand names Kymriah, Strimvelis, 
Luxturna and Glybera). 
172 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (ZOLGENSMA), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/126109/download. 
173 See e.g Rob Stein, At $2.1 Million, New Gene Therapy Is The Most Expensive Drug Ever, NPR (May 24, 2019); 
John Miller & Carolyn Humer, Novartis $2 Million Gene Therapy For Rare Disorder Is World's Most Expensive 
Drug, REUTERS (May 24, 2019). See also Bill Cassidy, How Will We Pay For The Coming Generation of Potentially 
Curative Gene Therapies?, STAT , (Jun. 12, 2019) (outlining both newly adopted and proposed payment solutions to 
address the cost of expensive drugs, and which could be potentially applicable to gene therapies); Mark R. Trusheim 
et al., Alternative State-Level Financing for Hepatitis C Treatment—The “Netflix Model,” 320 J. AM. MED ASS’N 
1977 (Nov. 18, 2018) (providing background on Cassidy’s proposal). 
174 See Mukherjee, Protect at All Costs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (framing the FDA approval of 
the first immunosuppressant as the de facto moment in which biologics entered the United States market). 
175 Id., ib. See also Dawn M. Ecker et al., The Therapeutic Monoclonal Antibody Market, 7 MABS 9, 9 (2015). Prior 
to 1986, insulin and several therapeutic proteins had also entered the United States market through the FDA’s NDA 
(new drug application) pathway—which technically applies to small-molecule drugs—and not the BLA (biologic 
license application) pathway. See Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 684-685 (2010). 
176 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL APPROVALS BY YEAR (databases available at 
https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/BiologicalApprovalsbyYear/default.ht
m). 
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small-molecule drugs was created by the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.177 As a result, the generic 
industry soared.178 Hatch-Waxman, however, provided no similar avenue for large-molecule 
drugs. This scenario changed in 2010, with the enactment of the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act,179 a component of the Affordable Care Act package.180 The Act established an 
abbreviated pathway for the approval of drugs that are biosimilar or interchangeable with an 
already approved biologic. These follow-on biologics cannot be properly characterized as generics, 
as it is technically impossible to create a replica of a biologic drug. But follow-on biologics were 
expected to offer a clinically equivalent alternative to originator biologics, as well as a relatively 
more affordable one.  
From a regulatory perspective, one of the main contrasts between small-molecule drugs 
and biologics is that the period of FDA-administered exclusivity regime is significantly different. 
Conventional drugs benefit from a period of five years of protection over clinical trial data, 
independent of the status of patent protection.181 The period of market exclusivity often expires 
before patents covering small-molecule drugs do.182 Biologics, on the other hand, benefit from a 
much longer exclusivity period, currently set at 12 years.183 
 
B. FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS  
 
The result of protracted negotiations,184 the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation 
Act (BPCIA) was enacted in 2010, a few years before the beginning the first wave of patent term 
expiration for biologic drugs took place, and around the time the second wave of patent term 
expiration for conventional drugs began unfolding. 
Like Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA created an expedited review and approval process for 
second-comers wishing to compete with a drug previously approved by the FDA.185 Unlike 
conventional drugs covered by Hatch-Waxman, biologic drugs cannot be replicated to create 
generic versions. As a result, the BPCIA establishes an abbreviated pathway for the licensure of 
                                                        
177 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). 
178 See Aaron S. Kesselheim and Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed 
Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 295, 307-312 (2015). 
179 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, 804 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
180 42 U.S.C. § 262. 
181 Hatch Waxman provision 
182 Price & Rai, supra note 9, at 1027. 
183 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A). See also id. § 262(k)(7)(B) (prohibiting the FDA from accepting biosimilar 
applications until four years have passed from the date of the approval of the originator biologic). 
184 See Carver et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 671(discussing the negotiation process, which 
with regard to some of the issues covered by the BPCIA took as long as ten years). 
185 In addition to establishing an abbreviated pathway for the licensure of follow-on biologics, the BPCIA also 
regulates the approval of new biologics and lays out the framework for challenges to patents covering biologics. See, 
respectively, 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) and § 262(k)(6) (2012). The complexity of the statute has prompted Federal Circuit 
Judge Lourie to quip that “Winston Churchill once described Russia as a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma . . . [t]hat is this statute.” Amgen v. Sandoz, 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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two different types of follow-on biologics186 that is substantially different from the Hatch-Waxman 
generic pathway.187 
The BPCIA distinguishes between biosimilar and interchangeable follow-on biologics.188 
Sponsors of biosimilars must demonstrate that their product is “highly similar”189 to the reference 
product,190 and that there are “no clinically meaningful differences” between the follow-on and the 
reference biologic.191 When applying for a license, sponsors of biosimilars may rely on pre-
existing, publicly available data establishing the safety, purity and potency of the reference 
product.192 In addition to showing that the biosimilar meets the standards of high similarity and 
absence of clinically meaningful differences when compared to the reference product,193 sponsors 
are required to submit specific information regarding any facilities where the biosimilar is 
produced, as well as manufacturing processes.194  
Sponsors of interchangeable follow-on biologics must demonstrate that, in addition to 
meeting the standards for biosimilarity, their product may be used as a substitute for the reference 
biologic without “the intervention of the health care provider who prescribed the reference 
product.”195 In practice, and in line with FDA guidance,196 the latter requirement means that the 
interchangeable product “can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference 
product in any given patient.”197 
While the BPCIA was signed into law in 2010, the FDA did not approve a single biosimilar 
until March 2015.198 The following year, the Agency approved three biosimilars, followed by five 
in 2017,199 including the first biosimilar to be used in the treatment of any type of cancer.200 In 
2018, seven biosimilars were approved, and in 2019 that number climbed to 10.201 As of January 
                                                        
186 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOSIMILAR AND INTERCHANGEABLE PRODUCTS (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products. 
187 See generally, Erika Lietzan, The Uncharted Waters of Competition and Innovation in Biological Medicines, 44 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 883 (2017). 
188 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2012). 
189 Id. § 262(i)(2)(A) (2012). 
190 Id. § 262(i)(4) (2012) (defining reference product as a “single biological product” already licensed by the FDA). 
191 Id. § 262(i)(2)(B) (2012). 
192 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(iii). 
193 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)- (IV) (2012). 
194 Id. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V) (2012). 
195 Id. § 262(i)(3) (2012). 
196 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING INTERCHANGEABILITY WITH A REFERENCE 
PRODUCT, (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/124907/download (providing guidance with a focus on therapeutic 
protein biologics), at 5. 
197 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). 
198 Sandoz, FDA Approves First Biosimilar Zarxio (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.us.sandoz.com/news/media-
releases/fda-approves-first-biosimilar-zarxiotm-filgrastimsndz (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
199 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOSIMILAR PRODUCT INFORMATION (Jul. 23, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-product-information (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
200 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA APPROVES FIRST BIOSIMILAR FOR THE TREATMENT OF CANCER (Sept. 14, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm576112.htm (last accessed Jan. 9, 
2020). 
201 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIOSIMILAR PRODUCT INFORMATION, supra note 199. 
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2020, there are 26 biosimilars approved by the FDA.202 To date, no interchangeable follow-on 
biologic has been approved in the United States.203 
As biosimilars begin entering the market and compete with biologics, they are expected to 
translate into savings to patients and the health system in the near future. Estimates, however, vary 
widely. A study from 2018 calculated that, between 2017 and 2026, direct spending on biologics 
would decrease by $54 billion as a result of biosimilar competition.204 Another one, referring to 
the period between 2014 and 2024, posited that savings generated by the introduction of 
biosimilars could be as high as $250 billion.205 A 2019 study put that number back at $60 billion 
over the next decade.206 
Even though savings brought about through biosimilar competition are considerable,207 
experts agree that they are very unlikely to be proportionally as high as the ones triggered by the 
introduction of generics vis-à-vis conventional drugs. Generic competition drives prices down 
sharply. A recent study on the United States market reported savings of almost $2 trillion 
attributable to sales of generics in lieu of brand-name drugs between 2009 and 2018.208 Follow-on 
biologics, in contrast, are estimated to reduce prices by 10% to 30%.209 In Europe, where biosimilar 
competition began years ahead of the United States,210 early indicators put that number at around 
25%. Even though these percentages are substantially lower than discounts introduced by generics, 
it is worth pointing out that biologics are significantly costlier to manufacturers and pricier to 
consumers than conventional drugs.211 As such, relative savings introduced by biosimilar 
competition should not be overlooked. The following section introduces a case study illustrating 
this point, focusing on the biologic Humira, which has been the world’s best-selling drug in any 
category for the past seven years. 
 
                                                        
202 BIOSIMILAR PRODUCT INFORMATION, supra note 199. 
203 The FDA finalized guidance on the pathway for expedited review and approval of interchangeable biologic 
products in mid-2019. See supra, note 196. 
204 Andrew W. Mulcahy et al., Biosimilar Cost Savings in the United States: Initial Experience and Future 
Potential, 7 RAND HEALTH Q. 3 (2018) (further noting that the estimated amount is the equivalent of roughly 3% of 
estimated spending on biologics during the same period). 
205 Express Scripts, The $250 Billion Potential of Biosimilars (Apr. 13, 2013) (noting that calculations were based 
on 11 biosimilar entering the market). 
206 BIOSIMILARS FORUM, STRUCTURAL MARKET CHANGES NEEDED IN U.S. TO ACHIEVE COST-SAVINGS FROM 
BIOSIMILARS (Mar. 19, 2019), at 3. 
207 See infra, Part III. 
208 See e.g. ASS’N. ACCESSIBLE MEDS., 2019 Generic Drug and Biosimilars Access and Savings in the U.S., 
https://accessiblemeds.org/resources/blog/2019-generic-drug-and-biosimilars-access-savings-us-report (last accessed 
Jan. 9, 2020). 
209 U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 
[hereinafter EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES] (2009), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-
competition-federal-trade-commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf. 
210 See Mergelin, infra note 364. 
211 Infra, Part III. 
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III. PAY-FOR-DELAY DEALS IN THE CONTEXT OF BIOLOGICS 
 
A. A CASE STUDY ON HUMIRA  
 
1. The World’s Best-Selling Drug 
 
First approved in United States in late 2002,212 Humira, an anti-inflammatory biologic,213 
has been used in the treatment of a wide array of diseases, including rheumatoid arthritis,214 certain 
forms of psoriasis,215 ulcerative colitis216 and Crohn’s disease.217  
Humira has often been described as a “miracle drug”218 and has enjoyed great commercial 
success.219 At a time when breakthroughs in the conventional drug space appear increasingly 
scarce,220 the popularity of Humira, as well as the relative consensus221 in the medical literature 
reviewing it,222 speak to the current emphasis placed on biologics as the most promising drugs 
available to patients. 
                                                        
212 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CBER Approval Letter, Adalimumab (HUMIRA) (Dec. 31, 2002). 
213 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (HUMIRA), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/125057s232lbl.pdf. 
214 Lynne M. Bang & J. M. Keating, Adalimumab: A Review of Its Use in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 18 BIODRUGS 121 
(2004). 
215 Eihab A. Alwawi et al., Treating Psoriasis with Adalimumab, 4 THERAPEUTIC CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 345 (2008). 
216 William J. Sandborn et al., Adalimumab Induces and Maintains Clinical Remission in Patients with Moderate-to-
severe Ulcerative Colitis, 142 GASTROENTEROLOGY 257 (2012). 
217 Andrea Cassinotti et al., Adalimumab for the Treatment of Crohn’s Disease, 2 BIOLOGICS 763 (2008). 
218 Elizabeth Glasure, A Look at Miracle Drug Humira’s Journey to Proven Efficacy, BIOSPACE (Dec. 5, 2018). 
219 See e.g. Mukherjee, Protect at All Costs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (underscoring the positive 
impact of Humira across different patient populations). It is nonetheless worth pointing out that Humira’s 
manufacturer (initially Abbott Laboratories and then its spin-off, AbbVie) has been chastised by the FDA for 
mishandling death complaints related to Humira, and it has also been involved in litigation for failure to warn about 
certain severe side effects See Ed Silverman, AbbVie is Reprimanded by the FDA For Failing to Properly Probe 
Death Complaints, STAT (Jun. 8, 2018) (noting that Humira was not the only product for which the manufacturer 
had improperly dealt with death complaints); Tietz v. Abbott Laboratories, (2013) (finding that the manufacturer had 
failed to warn patients of the risk of lung infection, as well as breach of duty of care under state law for failure to 
warn physicians about said risk); Delano v. Abbott Labs., 908 F. Supp. 2d (2012) (challenging the manufacturer’s 
failure to update Humira’s black-box warning to include information on a certain type of fungal infection, but 
ultimately dismissed); Murthy v. Abbott Labs, 847 F. Spp. 2d 958 (2012) (claiming failure to warn of a possible 
association between Humira and heightened risk of certain types of lymphoma, also dismissed for failure to state a 
claim). 
220 Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, supra note 9, at 1026 (noting that 
“[s]pending on small-molecule drugs is close to stagnant, especially in developed countries”). 
221 At least one study has suggested that, given its price point in 2017, Humira was not cost-effective, and that there 
were at least two competitors that might work better for rheumatoid arthritis. See Jackie Syrop, Humira Not Cost 
Effective for RA, ICER Report Concludes, CENTER FOR BIOSIMILARS (Apr. 11, 2017). 
222 But see note 219 and accompanying text. 
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Since 2012, Humira has been the world’s best-selling drug, among conventional drugs and 
biologics alike,223 with revenue steadily increasing every year since 2012 through 2019. As of late 
2018, Humira had generated life-time sales in excess of $115 billion,224 and is commercialized in 
over 60 markets.225 According to the most recent data, relative to 2018, Humira brought in $19.9 
billion in worldwide sales, a number that represents an 8.2% increase from 2017.226 In 2016, global 
sales generated $16.1 billion, up from $14.1 billion in 2015, $12.5 billion in 2014, $10.7 billion in 
2013 and $9.3 billion in 2012.227 
While Humira is a blockbuster drug globally, it has derived most of its revenue from the 
United States market. It also accounts for the majority (60%) of the revenue of its current 
manufacturer, Chicago-based AbbVie.228 
The record-shattering revenue generated by Humira is not only a function of its popularity. 
In addition to the main patent covering its composition, set to expire in late 2016,229 Humira was 
at one point covered by over one hundred additional patents,230 which have largely contributed to 
giving AbbVie the ability to charge progressively more for Humira. Between 2006 and 2017, the 
price increased more than threefold, from $16,636 to $58,612 a year.231 On average, AbbVie raised 
the price more than 12% a year.232 In 2014-2015 alone, the price hike was 22%.233 Calculations 
indicate that, after rebates, Humira patients currently pay close to $40,000 a year.234 
The number of patents surrounding Humira has long been the subject of discussion. In a 
2015 presentation, AbbVie’s CEO, Richard Gonzalez, detailed the company’s strategy to protect 
Humira’s “broad patent estate” in the United States,235 which entailed keeping Humira’s 
intellectual property alive for as long as possible,236 as well as continuing to pursue new indications 
                                                        
223 Andrew Humphreys, Top 200 Medicines Annual Report 2019: The King of Medicines, PHARMA LIVE (Aug. 11, 
2019). 
224 Bob Herman, Humira Sales Approach $20 Billion, AXIOS (Jan. 25, 2019). 
225 See Mukherjee, Protect at All Costs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
226 Herman, Humira Sales Approach $20 Billion, supra note 224. 
227 STATISTA, ABBVIE'S REVENUE FROM TOP PRODUCT HUMIRA FROM 2011 TO 2018 (IN MILLION U.S. DOLLARS) 
(2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/318206/revenue-of-humira/. The year before it became the world’s best-
seller drug, Humira generated $7.9 billion in global revenue. Early on, just two years after receiving FDA approval, 
Humira was generating as much as $2 billion in global revenue, already well above the threshold for a drug to be 
considered a blockbuster, which is typically seen as $1 billion. See Mukherjee, Protect at All Costs, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined..  
228 Mukherjeem, supra note 227. 
229 U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382 (Human antibodies that bind human TNFα) (listing an expiration date of December 
31, 2016). 
230 Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the World’s Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Sept. 7, 2017). To be sure, Humira is not the only biologic with a patent estate in the three digits. Remicade, a 
biologic manufactured by Janssen (a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson), which also targets several inflammatory 
diseases, is another example of this phenomenon. Id., ib. 
231 Mukherjeem, supra note 227. See also Danny Hakim, Humira’s Best-Selling Drug Formula: Start at a High 
Price. Go Higher, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018). 
232 Mukherjeem, supra note 227. 
233 ASS’N ACCESSIBLE MED., ENSURING THE FUTURE OF ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES IN THE U.S. (2018), at 14. 
234 See Hakim, supra note 231. 
235 Richard Gonzalez, AbbVie Long-Term Strategy, ABBVIE (Oct. 30, 2015), at 14-15. See also infra, Part III.A.2. 
236 Gonzalez, AbbVie Long-Term Strategy, at 13. 
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for which Humira could gain FDA approval.237 At the time of Gonzalez’s presentation, there were 
over 70 patents covering Humira set to expire between 2016 and 2034.238 Crucially, the most 
significant patent in the estate—the one covering its composition—was set to expire on December 
31, 2016 in the United States, thus ushering in the beginning of the end for Humira’s patent 
estate.239 
Ordinarily, the expiry of the patent covering Humira’s composition, combined with a series 
of challenges to Humira’s secondary patents, would have enabled follow-on competitors to start 
competing with AbbVie immediately after the date of expiry of the composition patent. In fact, 
the FDA started approving Humira biosimilars in 2016, and it continues to do so, having approved 
four biosimilars to date. 
However, contrary to expectations and to the normal flow of biologic-biosimilar 
competition, no Humira biosimilars have entered the United States market. Starting in 2017, 
AbbVie began pursuing a strategy that allows the company to remain the sole manufacturer of 
Humira in the United States, by entering into agreements with biosimilar manufacturers that 
effectively delay commercialization of any products competing with Humira until 2023.240 At the 
same time, these agreements allow AbbVie’s competitors to sell their biosimilars in Europe. The 
following sections detail the chronology and substance of these agreements, and explain their 
competition-distorting effects. 
 
2. Anticompetitive Agreements  
 
As seen above, AbbVie’s strategy to maintain Humira’s market share entails taking 
advantage of a large patent portfolio while exploring new indications for which Humira might be 
prescribed. Importantly, AbbVie’s intellectual property strategy relies on two fronts: first, the 
number of staggered patents surrounding Humira; and second, the company’s ability to fend off 
lawsuits challenging the validity of the remaining patents.  
From a quantitative perspective, the sheer number of patents related to Humira constitute 
a thicket that is hard to break. The rate at which AbbVie applied for, and was granted, patents on 
Humira-related technology spiked in the years prior to the expiry of the composition patent: in 
2015 alone, 32 patents issued, followed by 21 in 2016, the last full year in which Humira’s 
composition was patented.241 Overall, and in the United States alone, AbbVie applied for 247 
patents related to Humira technology, 89% of which were submitted to the PTO after receiving 
FDA approval for its original indication.242 
From a qualitative perspective, even if some of the patents in the Humira estate were to be 
deemed invalid, the company is taking advantage of the fact that the invalidation process is time- 
and resource-consuming. When asked about possible challenges to Humira’s secondary patents, 
                                                        
237 Id., 11 and 17. 
238 See Koons, supra note 230 (noting that AbbVie’s projected duration of Humira’s intellectual property amounts to 
“more than double the protection span a drug such as Humira might normally expect”). 
239 See Appendix 1 (providing an overview of Humira’s patent estate). 
240 See Appendix 2 (providing a chronology of the settlements). 
241 See Appendix 1. 
242 INITIATIVE FOR MEDICINES, ACCESS & KNOWLEDGE, Comment Submitted to the Federal Trade Commission, at 2 
(further noting that AbbVie applied for over three times more Humira-related patents in the United States than in 
Europe). 
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AbbVie’s CEO emphasized that “[t]he strategy that we [AbbVie] have in place is not one that 
hinges on one or two patents.”243  
A salient component of the company’s intellectual property management plan consists in 
adopting a protracted litigation strategy. In 2016, as Humira’s composition patent in the United 
States244 was coming to an end, and a month before the FDA approved the first Humira biosimilar, 
AbbVie sued the would-be competitor for infringement of ten Humira-related patents.245 In the 
complaint, AbbVie identified an additional 51 patents, but stated that it was not pursuing those as 
a matter of infringement for the time being.246 The strategy gave AbbVie the possibility of 
initiating a different lawsuit at a later time, hence protracting litigation on Humira. If more patents 
continued to be invalided or expired, or if the biosimilar manufacturer was found not to be 
infringing on existent patents, AbbVie could then bring another lawsuit, which would in practice 
prevent the biosimilar from being commercialized in the United States. 
This strategy, which lasted just over a year, then morphed into a string of contractual 
arrangements with would-be competitors that directly sought to shelter Humira from competition 
in the United States market. On September 28, 2017 AbbVie announced it had entered into an 
agreement247 with the manufacturer of the first biosimilar to Humira, an American pharmaceutical 
company called Amgen.248 Even though Amgen’s biosimilar had been licensed by the FDA to be 
marketed in the United States,249 Amgen agreed to delay its commercialization until January 2023. 
Per the terms of the agreement, Amgen would nonetheless start commercializing the biosimilar in 
Europe in October 2018.250 Moreover, Amgen agreed to sell its biosimilar in Europe under a non-
exclusive license, which gave AbbVie the ability to pursue additional licensing deals with other 
biosimilar manufacturers.251  
In the meantime, the FDA continued to approve biosimilars to Humira. A second biosimilar 
was approved in 2017,252 and a third in 2018.253 A fourth biosimilar was approved in early 2019.254 
Several other biosimilar companies signaled their readiness to enter the market, and several are 
                                                        
243 Koons, supra note 230. 
244 In Europe, the patent expired in June 2017. See Generics and Biosimilars Initiative, Adalimumab Biosimilar 
Imraldi Makes Waves in Europe (Feb. 1, 2019), http://gabionline.net/Biosimilars/General/Adalimumab-biosimilar-
Imraldi-makes-waves-in-Europe. 
245 See Ed Silverman, AbbVie and Amgen Lock Horns in the Latest Squabble over Biosimilars, STAT Magazine 
(Aug. 8, 2016). 
246 AbbVie Inc. and AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd. v. Amgen Inc. and Amgen Manufacturing Ltd. (complaint available at 
http://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ded-1-99-cv-de431-1.pdf), at 3. 
247 See Jessica Dye, AbbVie Makes Peace with Amgen over Humira Patents, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017) 
(https://www.ft.com/content/ff1dea83-cbf8-321b-8a59-2fc96158c546). 
248 Amgen manufactures both biologics and biosimilar. CITE https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/7-companies-
to-know-in-the-emerging-biosimilars-field/433539/. 
249 Amgen’s biosimilar was approved in September 2016, a year before the agreement between AbbVie and Amgen. 
See Appendix 2. 
250 See Appendix 2. 
251 Ib. 
252 Cyltezo, manufactured by Boehringer. See Appendix 2. 
253 Hyrimoz, manufactured by Sandoz. See Appendix 2. 
254 Hadlima, manufactured by Samsung Bioepis. See Appendix 2. 
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expected to successfully navigate the FDA licensure process in the near future.255 Again—in 
theory—the existence of FDA-licensed products should have meant that multiple biosimilars 
would have entered the market and competed with Humira. That was not the case. 
In 2018, AbbVie struck six additional deals with biosimilar manufacturers. As with 
Amgen’s biosimilar, these six would-be competitors agreed not to sell their products in the United 
States until 2023, but are free to commercialize them immediately in the European market. Two 
other deals took place in 2019,256 bringing the total to nine agreements that effectively eliminate 
competition for Humira in the United States for over five years: the first agreement (with Amgen) 
was signed on September 28, 2017, with an agreed entry date in the United States market set for 
January 31, 2023; the remaining entry dates for the other eight biosimilars range between June and 
December 15, 2023.257  
As of early 2020, five of the nine biosimilar manufacturers entering into agreements with 
AbbVie have not obtained FDA approval for their product. Among the ones that have successfully 
completed the licensure process, one stands out. Sandoz, the manufacturer of a biosimilar to 
Humira called Hyrimoz, struck a deal with AbbVie on October 11, 2018, agreeing to delay 
commercialization of the product in the United States until September 30, 2023.258 The FDA 
licensed Hyrimoz on October 31, 2018, nearly three weeks after the agreement.259 As a 
commentator aptly put it, the Agency “gave the green light” in 2018 to a product “that won’t be 
available until 2023.”260 This is not to say that the FDA was wrong in approving the biosimilar—
although Part IV will examine the problem from the perspective of the Agency and argue that the 
FDA can and should act remedially in situations like this one.261 Rather, it underscores how 
industry behavior can not only prolong legally sanctioned monopolies beyond their expected 
duration, but also deprive permissive gestures from regulatory agencies of their full meaning.262  
In addition to the anticompetitive nature of the agreements between biologic and biosimilar 
manufacturers, as well as the outcome of the FDA licensure process, AbbVie’s strategy to maintain 
its stronghold on Humira’s commercialization bears direct influence on intellectual property 
processes, particularly those involving the invalidation of improperly granted patents, a topic that 
the Article addresses in the following section. 
As noted at the end of this Part,263 the agreements between AbbVie and several biosimilar 
manufacturers were eventually challenged in mid-2019 on antitrust and consumer protection 
grounds.264 But it is important to note here that the first legal challenge to these agreements arose 
over two years after the key patent on Humira expired. For that period of time, AbbVie retained 
its monopolistic position in the market, even though the legal mechanisms that initially gave the 
                                                        
255 See Andrew Pollack, supra note 169. 
256 Dunn, AbbVie Completes Humira Sweep, supra note 5. 
257 See Appendix 2. 
258 Ib. 
259 Ib. 
260 Alex Keown, FDA Approves Humira Biosimilar That Won’t Be Available Until 2023, BioSpace (Nov. 1, 2018). 
261 Infra, Part IV.B. 
262 Infra, Part IV.C.3 (arguing that FDA licensure of pharmaceuticals whose sponsors have entered into certain 
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company the power to exclude competitors were no longer present. The next section briefly 
explores the consequences of this lack of legal interventions. 
 
3. Consequences of Anticompetitive Agreements 
 
In 2018, AbbVie increased the price of Humira by 9.7%.265 The following year, there was 
a price hike of 6.2%.266 And in January 2020 AbbVie again raised the price by more than 7%.267 
While Humira price hikes have long occurred on a yearly basis,268 2018 marked the first time that 
AbbVie increased the price after entering into the first of its agreements with biosimilar 
manufacturers. At that point, the main patent covering Humira had been expired for at least a 
year.269 Keeping in mind that Humira is currently priced at close to $40,000 per year after rebates, 
or $50,000 if there are none,270 the post-patent absence of competition poses very serious economic 
consequences for patients, as well as for the healthcare system. One study, for instance, has 
estimated that the 9.7% increase in 2018 will have added $1.2 billion in costs to the healthcare 
system in the United States.271  
As Humira’s patent protection began thinning out in late 2016, worldwide sales began 
declining. Data pertaining to the first quarter of 2019 show that global sales of Humira decreased 
by 5.6%.272 That decline, however, is due to biosimilar competition outside the United States. 
Starting in 2018, the same biosimilar that companies agreed not to commercialize in the United 
States began entering the European market, as per the terms of the agreements with AbbVie.273  
In Europe, the uptake of biosimilars was quick. Take the case of Imraldi, the fourth 
biosimilar to Humira approved by the FDA in the United States.274 Imraldi was approved by the 
European Commission in August 2018 and reached the market the following October.275 By 
November, it had acquired 62% of market share in Germany,276 which has traditionally been 
Humira’s largest European market.277 
                                                        
265 ENSURING THE FUTURE OF ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES, at 12. 
266 Bob Herman, 2019's Drug Price Hikes Are Here, AXIOS (Jan. 2, 2019). 
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The first four biosimilars to Humira launched in Europe in October 2018.278 As a result, 
prices came down 10% to 80% across Europe279 when compared to those charged by AbbVie for 
Humira before facing biosimilar competition. Scandinavia registered the steepest discounts,280 
while countries like the United Kingdom saw variation in the range of 15% to 35%.281 
As a result of biosimilar competition, AbbVie itself has lowered the price of Humira in 
Europe, both to preserve a modicum of market share, and to comply with varying pricing rules set 
by national authorities.282 As with its competitors in Europe, AbbVie’s discounts span the range 
of 10% to 80%, with AbbVie’s CEO stating in late 2018 that “discounting has been on the higher 
end.”283 
Put simply, the biological product needed by patients taking Humira in the United States 
is supplied at often deeply discounted prices in the European market, with discounts being offered, 
among others, by the same company that charges increasingly higher prices to American 
consumers.  
The first set of problems are thus of economic nature, resulting in unfair treatment of 
consumers—who are also patients—in the United States. Additionally, suppressing competition 
in a market already distorted by patent and regulatory exclusivities raises questions from the 
perspective of innovation policy. The prolongment of AbbVie’s de facto monopoly circumvents 
the legal architecture of R&D incentives in the biopharmaceutical arena. AbbVie’s market position 
is extended through contractual fiat even after the statutory market-distorting, innovation-
enhancing284 distortions to the market have ended. 
Moreover, there are systemic consequences likely to stretch beyond the realm of Humira. 
AbbVie’s strategy may operate as a blueprint in the future for large biologic manufacturers wishing 
to preserve post-patent and post-exclusivity market share. As a consequence, there might be fewer 
challenges to secondary patents, among which there is a greater likelihood of weaknesses affecting 
patent validity. The first agreement pursued by AbbVie, with biosimilar manufacturer Amgen, 
happened on the heels of patent challenges—and it functioned precisely as a challenge stopper.  
Additional challenges to Humira’s patent estate, brought by other biosimilar 
manufacturers, also came to a halt as AbbVie entered into these agreements. Take the case of 
Californian biosimilar manufacturer Coherus, which challenged several patents covering Humira’s 
dosing regimen in 2016.285 The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the Patent and 
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Trademark Office struck the patents down in 2017.286 In January 2019, Coherus entered into an 
agreement with AbbVie, agreeing to delay commercialization of its biosimilar to Humira until 
2023 in the United States, while marketing it non-exclusively in other markets, as well to cease all 
intellectual property litigation related to Humira.287 A few months later, Boehringer Ingelheim, a 
German manufacturer whose biosimilar to Humira had gained FDA approval in 2017, entered into 
a similar agreement with AbbVie, including the obligation to drop all challenges to Humira’s 
patent estate.288 Boehringer was the ninth and outstanding would-be competitor settling with 
AbbVie.289 With this final agreement, all patent challenges to Humira came to an end. 
The opportunity cost of stopping these patent challenges might never be fully appreciated. 
Ongoing litigation was based on secondary patents, some of which were challenged and 
invalidated. As a result of the plethora of agreements AbbVie entered into, courts and adjudicatory 
bodies are now unlikely to have the opportunity to review other potentially weak or unworthy 
patents still active in Humira’s estate. 
Collectively, the problems referenced in this section stem from an entity-specific behavior 
as the patent landscape for many blockbuster biologics undergoes significant changes. However, 
it is important to note that Humira is not an isolated case when it comes to surrounding a drug with 
thickets of patents. A report surveying the top 12-grossing drugs in the United States found that 
there is an average of 125 patent applications filed per drug, with an average of 71 patents granted 
per drug.290 Similarly, price increases among blockbuster drugs are the norm. Since 2012, only 
one of these 12 drugs has decreased in price, while collectively prices have increased by 68%.291 
All of these drugs, like Humira, have been on the market for well over a decade.292 The precedent 
set by AbbVie’s string of anticompetitive agreements, if left unchecked, offers an easily replicable 
strategy for future competition-restricting behaviors by manufacturers of biologics wishing to 
preserve their exclusionary power in the post-patent world at the expense of patient populations. 
 
4. Lawsuits Challenging the Validity of Pay-for-Delay Deals 
 
                                                        
286 FDA NEWS, PTAB Invalidates AbbVie’s Humira Dosing Patent — Again (Jul. 11, 2017), 
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The validity of the agreements to delay the entrance of Humira competitors in the United 
States market was eventually challenged in the first half of 2019.293 As of early 2020, there are six 
lawsuits targeting AbbVie and the biosimilar companies involved in these deals.294 
On March 18, UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, a New York-based employee welfare 
benefits fund,295 initiated a putative class action lawsuit296 claiming that AbbVie engaged in 
“unlawful market division agreements” to keep Humira competition at bay until 2023.297 
Reiterating claims by the biosimilar companies who had previously challenged some of Humira’s 
secondary patents,298 the lawsuit emphasizes the weakness of many secondary patents covering 
Humira,299 and contends that AbbVie leveraged Humira’s patent thicket to delay biosimilar 
competition in the Unites States from 2017 onwards.300 The complaint asserts that the agreements 
are anticompetitive as they result in an “unlawful market division” between Europe and the United 
States.301 Further, it notes that the duality in patent litigation strategy in the European and United 
States markets underscores the anticompetitive nature of these agreements: 
 
As in the U.S., AbbVie had Humira patent protection in Europe. But 
AbbVie ceded the European market to biosimilar competition—
despite that patent protection—in exchange for maintaining its 
monopoly in the U.S. (…) This trade-off meant that the lower price 
for Humira in Europe was subsidized by the much higher price in 
the United States where AbbVie unlawfully maintained its 
monopoly.302 
 
UFCW claims that AbbVie and the manufacturers of biosimilars to Humira entered into 
unlawful market division agreements in violation of the Sherman Act.303 The complaint further 
claims that AbbVie engaged in monopolization304 by unduly keeping a 100% market share for 
adalimumab (the active ingredient in Humira) in violation of federal antitrust law,305 as well as 
multiple state laws;306 that AbbVie and the biosimilar manufacturers engaged in conspiracy and 
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combination in restraint of trade under multiple state laws;307 and that all parties to the agreements 
violated principles of unjust enrichment in multiple states by overcharging members of the class 
action.308 
Four days after the UFCW complaint was entered, the City of Baltimore initiated a separate 
putative class action against AbbVie and only the first of the biosimilar companies to enter into a 
settlement, Amgen.309 Four other putative class actions started around the same period.310 
While the outcome of these lawsuits may break AbbVie’s monopoly in the United States 
and infuse the market with more affordable alternatives to Humira, it is important to note that more 
than two years had passed from the expiration of the main patent on Humira when the first lawsuit 
was brought against AbbVie,311 and over a year and half from the first settlement, between AbbVie 
and Amgen.312 If these class actions were to succeed, additional time would go by. For Humira 
patients in the United States, the interim period is far too long, and available remedies are unlikely 
to fully account for the supra-competitive prices these patients have been paying since patent 
expiration and FDA approval of biosimilars to Humira.313 
In theory, the law has the appropriate mechanisms to scrutinize potentially anticompetitive 
behavior, as well as to curb and penalize it, with antitrust frameworks at the forefront of this 
scrutiny. In practice, however, antitrust mechanisms tend to offer temporally protracted responses 
in situations like the one addressed in the Humira case study. 
Keeping in line with these propositions, the Article next offers a brief description of the 
antitrust framework applicable to pay-for-delay deals, and argues that, in addition to antitrust, 
another type of legal intervention is required to address these types of anticompetitive behaviors 
in an expeditious fashion.  
 
B. THE ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS PAY-FOR-DELAY DEALS 
 
The practice of delaying competition through settlements is not new, even though AbbVie 
was the first company to employ this strategy in the context of biologic-biosimilar competition. 
The Article now provides an overview of similar behaviors in previous situations, involving 
manufacturers of conventional drugs and their generic competitors, and briefly explains how the 
antitrust principles governing these settlements are transferable to the context of biologic-
biosimilar competition. 
 
1. Pay-for-Delay in the Pre-Biologics Era  
 
                                                        
307 Id., at 50-54. See, inter alia, Cal. Bus. Code §§ 16700, et seq.; Hawaii Code § 480, et seq.; 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. 10 / 3, et seq.; N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. §§ 340, et seq.; Wis. Stat. §§ 133.03, et seq. 
308 Id., at 62-82. 
309 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. AbbVie Inc., AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd., and Amgen Inc. 
310 See Miami Fraternal Order of Police vs AbbVie; Pipe Trades Services MN Welfare Fund vs AbbVie; St Paul 
Electrical Workers' Health Plan vs AbbVie; Welfare Plan of the International Union of Operating Engineers Locals 
v. AbbVie (all putative class actions naming only Amgen as co-defendant). 
311 See Appendix 2. 
312 Ib. 
313 The same arguments hold true for the supra-competitive costs supported by the United States health system 
during the same period of time. 
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As seen in Part I, the abbreviated regulatory pathway introduced by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was designed to enable generic competitors to enter markets as soon as relevant patents expired 
or were successfully challenged.314 In previous situations, the equilibrium between patent 
protection and second-comer competition was often disrupted by agreements between the 
manufacturer of a conventional drug and its would-be generic competitor. These agreements, 
which became known as “exclusion,” “reverse” or “pay-for-delay” settlements,315 came to the 
attention of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2000, precisely when the first wave of patent 
term expirations for blockbuster small-molecule drugs began unfolding. 
In FTC v. Actavis, the landmark 2013 case on pharmaceutical pay-for-delay settlements,316 
the Supreme Court delineated the structure of these agreements as follows: 
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two 
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the 
claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the 
patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B 
many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the 
patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way 
around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a “reverse 
payment” settlement agreement..317 
Throughout the 2000s—and between the first and second waves of en masse expiration of 
pharmaceutical patents—pay-for-delay became an increasingly popular strategy in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The number of potential pay-for-delay settlements monitored by the FTC 
rose from 3 in 2005 to 40 in 2012.318 In 2013, the FTC estimated that pay-for-delay was costing 
consumers in the United States an average of $3.5 billion per year.319 
The classic pay-for-delay scheme is embodied in Actavis. The case involved AndroGel, a 
form of synthetic testosterone manufactured by Solvay Pharmaceuticals.320 Generic drug 
manufacturers, including Actavis, filed an abbreviated new drug application with the FDA, 
certifying that the AndroGel formulation patent321 listed in the Agency’s Orange Book was invalid 
                                                        
314 Supra, notes 77. 
315 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BEFORE THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMPETITION POLICY AND 
CONSUMER RIGHTS ON PAY-FOR-DELAY DEALS: LIMITING COMPETITION AND COSTING CONSUMERS [hereinafter 
2013 FTC STATEMENT] (Jul. 23, 2013), at 1. 
316 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) [hereinafter Actavis]. 
317 Actavis, at 2227. 
318 2013 FTC STATEMENT, supra note 315, at 4. The year 2012 constitutes a relevant marker in this chronology, as it 
was the year in which the Supreme Court first addressed pay-for-delay in the context of pharmaceuticals. Infra, 
ACTAVIS. 
319 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN EDITH RAMIREZ, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMPETITION POLICY & CONSUMER RIGHTS, U.S. SENATE (Jul. 23, 2013), at 1 
(further noting the detrimental economic impact of these settlements on governmental health programs like 
Medicare and Medicaid). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s 
Actavis Decision [hereinafter Anticompetitive Patent Settlements], 15 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 3, 10 (2014) (noting 
that, under a pay-for-delay agreement, “[f]ormally, consumer welfare remains the same as it would be under 
continued monopoly production by a single firm.”). 
320 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ANDROGEL, https://www.fda.gov/media/80632/download. 
321 U.S. PATENT 6,503,894 (covering AndroGel’s formulation; AndroGel’s composition was not patented). 
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and that no patent infringement would occur upon commercialization of their generic products.322 
Solvay sued the generic companies.323 After thirty months, and per Hatch-Waxman rules, the FDA 
approved Actavis’ first-to-file application in the pendency of patent litigation.324 Instead of 
entering the market, Actavis (and other generic companies) settled with Solvay in 2006, agreeing 
to delay commercialization until 2015 in exchange for large sums of money.325 In the case of 
Actavis, the amount was estimated to range between $19 million and $30 million annually.326 
In 2009, the FTC filed a complaint claiming multiple violations of the Sherman and FTC 
Acts.327 The FTC noted that “by deferring competition, the parties would preserve monopoly rents 
that would be shared amongst them – at the expense of the consumer savings that would result 
from price competition.”328 Both the district and the Eleventh Circuit, however, dismissed the 
complaint.329 The Eleventh Circuit ruled in 2012 that pay-for-delay agreements were “immune 
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary 
potential of the patent.”330 The following year, the Supreme Court held pay-for-delay behavior 
“can sometimes violate the antitrust laws” and therefore the complaint should have been allowed 
to proceed.331 
 
2. The Actavis Framework for Pay-for-Delay Agreements 
 
In 2013, the Supreme Court took the view in Actavis that large and otherwise unjustified 
payments flowing from a pharmaceutical company to would-be competitors “can bring the risk of 
significant anticompetitive effects.”332 Pay-for-delay agreements are thus subject to antitrust 
scrutiny.333 Further, Actavis held that the antitrust analysis is separate from, and does not have to 
probe into, the validity of the patents associated with the drug in question.334  
The Court also determined that a rule-of-reason framework governs the antitrust 
analysis.335 This determination was contrary to the FTC’s contention that pay-for-delay deals were 
presumptively unlawful.336 The Court reasoned that  
                                                        
322 Actavis, at 2229.  
323 Actavis, ib. 
324 Id., ib. 
325 Id., ib. 
326 Id., ib. 
327 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CIVIL COMPLAINT, at 27-28. 
328 Id., at 14. 
329 Actavis, at 2227. 
330 FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012). 
331 Actavis, at 2227. 
332 Id., at 2236. 
333 Id., at 2237. 
334 Id., at 2230-31; Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
5. 
335 Actavis, supra note 317, at 2231. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV 81, 83 
(2018) (defining “rule of reason” as one that “requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that defendants with market 
power have engaged in anticompetitive conduct”). 
336 Actavis, at 2237. 
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the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive 
effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s 
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other 
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any 
other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any 
anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries.337 
While the Actavis framework dealt with potentially anticompetitive practices involving 
cash payments, both pre- and post-Actavis case law indicate that other types of behavior in pay-
for-delay deals can amount to anticompetitive behavior. For instance, in Palmer v. BRG, the 
Supreme Court ruled in 1990 that an agreement between competitors to cease competing could be 
considered “anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties split a market within which both do 
business or whether they merely reserve one market for one and another for the other.”338 Since 
Actavis, courts have directly addressed the problem of in-kind or non-cash payments.339 In 2016, 
for example, the First Circuit in In re Loestrin reversed a district court ruling interpreting Actavis 
to apply only to monetary payments.340 And, in King Drug Co. of Florence, the Third Circuit 
analyzed a case in which “payment” consisted of early entrance into the market for chewable 
anticonvulsant drugs, coupled with the brand-name manufacturer’s promise not to produce its own 
generic version of the drug, and held that such a combo met the Actavis threshold.341 As the court 
put it, even in cases in which consideration is not purely monetary 
an unusual, unexplained reverse transfer of considerable value from 
the patentee to the alleged infringer (…) may (…) give rise to the 
inference that it is a payment to eliminate the risk of competition.342 
In spite of occasional misapplications at the lower court level,343 Actavis is widely seen as 
a turning point in the field of pharmaceutical competition. Since Actavis was decided, the number 
of pay-for-delay deals has decreased.344  
Even though Actavis was decided with reference to conventional drugs, there is no reason 
not to apply Actavis to biologics on account of the structural differences between the two types of 
drugs.345 In the context of biologic-biosimilar competition, the skeletal elements of pay-for-delay 
remain the same as the ones enunciated by the Actavis court, as seen in the Humira case study 
above.346 There are, however, characteristics innate to antitrust interventions that render the current 
legal framework for curbing anticompetitive behaviors an unwieldy and often ineffective response 
                                                        
337 Id., ib. 
338 Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990). 
339 See Michael Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7 (2014) (analyzing non-cash forms of 
consideration in pay-for-delay deals).  
340 In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 542 (2016). 
341 King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2015). 
342 Id., at 394. 
343 See Michael Carrier, How Not to Apply Actavis, 109 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY (2014) (criticizing district court 
rulings in In Re Lamictal and In re Loestrin for misapplication of the Actavis framework). 
344 Michael Carrier, FTC v. Actavis: Where We Stand After 5 Years, IP WATCHDOG (Jun. 18, 2018) (suggesting that 
antitrust scrutiny has functioned as a deterrent to pay-for-delay agreements). 
345 Carrier & Minniti, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, supra note 12, at 24 (“regulation under the BPCIA 
easily offers sufficient similarities to the Hatch-Waxman Act to allow application of Actavis’s broad principles”). 
346 Supra, Part III.A. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587130
 37 
to the harms caused to patients and health systems by pay-for-delay agreements between 
pharmaceutical companies. The Article now turns to the downside of reliance on antitrust 
frameworks to curb these behaviors, with a particular focus on the detrimental effects it poses to 
biologic-biosimilar competition as patent protection for the formers thins out. 
 
3. Shortcomings of the Antitrust Framework  
 
No single branch of law aseptically regulates competitive behaviors in markets for 
pharmaceutical drugs. As Michael Carrier and Carl Minniti have observed, this is a field in which 
antitrust, patent law and a heterogenous body of regulations intersect with extra-legal factors,347 
ranging from economics to public policy.348 Yet, from a perspective of addressing potentially 
anticompetitive occurrences, antitrust remains the primary legal tool for dealing with issues like 
those presented by pay-for-delay deals.349  
Responses offered by the application of antitrust principles, however, have to contend with 
several problems, from overreliance on concepts of efficiency to definitional problems posed by 
the concept of market power.350 In the pharmaceutical arena in particular, the application of 
antitrust law is further complicated by the complexity of markets and regulatory regimes.351 
Moreover, underlying the specificities of pharmaceutical antitrust, is the temporal nature of 
antitrust interventions in cases like pay-for-delay: Actavis offers the possibility of ex post scrutiny, 
but that scrutiny is bound to take place after a significant period of time—and consequently of 
potentially protracted harmful behavior affecting patients in need of biopharmaceutical products. 
The case study on Humira illustrated this shortcoming of the remedial facet of antitrust: while the 
FDA approved the first biosimilar to Humira in 2016, anticipating a 2017 market entrance,352 it 
was not until March 2019 that the first antitrust lawsuits were brought.353 Similarly, there was a 
                                                        
347 Carrier & Minniti, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that “[t]he pharmaceutical industry lies at the intersection of patent 
law, antitrust law, federal and state regulations, and complex markets”). See also Patricia M. Danzon, Competition 
and Antitrust Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Report to the Regional Competition Center for Latin America 
(2014), at 3. 
348 See generally STUART O. SCHWEITZER & Z. JOHN LU, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY: 
PERSPECTIVES, PROMISES, AND PROBLEMS (2018); Frederic M. Scherer, Pharmaceutical Innovation, in HANDBOOK 
ECON. OF INNOVATION, BRONWYN H. HALL & NATHAN ROSENBERG, EDS. (2010); Michael Carrier, Two Puzzles 
Resolved: Of the Schumpeter - Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393 
(2008). 
349 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW (4th edition). See also Eleanor 
M. Fox, Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182 (1981) (framing the role 
of antitrust law as promoting multiple goals, among which the “protection of the competition process as market 
governor”). 
350 See e.g. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976) (arguing for an efficiency-centric approach to antitrust 
regulation); Fox, supra note 349, at 1176-1177 (surveying the centrality of efficiency arguments in antitrust 
scholarship); Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV 1303, 1305 (2017) (exploring 
the multiple functions of market power in competition law and policy). For a general critique of current antitrust 
law, see TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018). 
351 See Michael Carrier, Three Challenges for Pharmaceutical Antitrust, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2019). 
352 Supra, note 249 and accompanying text. 
353 Supra, Part III.A.4. 
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time lag in previous pay-for-delay deals: the Actavis settlement took place in 2006, but it took 
almost three years for the FTC to initiate litigation against the parties involved in the deal.354  
The delayed nature of antitrust responses is of heightened relevance in the context of pay-
for-delay involving biologic products for two reasons. First, the reference drugs affected by the 
ongoing wave of patent expirations, both presently and in the foreseeable future, are among the 
most promising available to patients suffering from serious diseases,355 including several types of 
cancers, multiple sclerosis, diabetes, asthma and different forms of arthritis.356 And second, these 
drugs are some of the most expensive ever to come to the United States market.357 Maintaining 
artificially high prices in the post-patent, post-exclusivity market generates detrimental effects of 
a magnitude that patients and health systems had not experienced before. 
The final section of the Article links this magnitude of detrimental effects to the need for 
regulatory interventions to curb pay-for-delay outside the realm of antitrust. It explains why 
antitrust law and antitrust regulators should not be the sole players tasked with corrective functions 
in cases of pay-for-delay. Expanding on this idea, the Article argues for a greater ex post role for 
a different regulator with institutional, statutory and policy capacity to influence competitive 
behaviors—the FDA. 
 
 
IV. BEYOND ANTITRUST: A NOVEL SOLUTION FOR ADDRESSING ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR 
 
So far, this Article has described the challenges faced by the branch of the law specifically 
designed to address anticompetitive behaviors in responding to pay-for-delay. It now turns to a 
solution outside the realm of antitrust that could serve as a deterrent for this type of behaviors: it 
argues that the FDA is well placed to address some of the failures that currently plague biosimilar 
competition. It posits that, by granting licenses that result in no product commercialization, FDA’s 
role as an administrative agency is reduced to empty gesture. This Part shows that the FDA has 
both the statutory authority and the obligation to revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of pay-for-
delay. This solution is also consistent with policy goals: given the Agency’s role as a locus for 
innovation policy, the FDA should apply the licensing revocation framework to cases of pay-for-
delay as a way to encourage motivated manufacturers to seek regulatory approval for their 
products, while compelling inactive players to clear the field for legitimate competition.  
Part A summarizes the need for regulatory interventions outside the field of antitrust in 
order to address pay-for-delay in the context of biologic-biosimilar competition. Part B makes the 
case that the FDA is institutionally well placed to address the problem. Part C argues that, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, the FDA can and should revoke biosimilar licenses when 
manufacturers fail to produce the approve product within a reasonable timeframe. Part C also 
outlines the proposed regime, detailing its mechanics and possible forms of implementation, as 
                                                        
354 Actavis, at 2290. 
355 See Bahija Jallal, Realizing the Promise of Biologics, supra note 165 (observing that “[t]he future of biologics 
and its growing potential to benefit patients with unmet medical needs has perhaps never been more promising”); 
see also supra note 171 and accompanying text (emphasizing the high cost of the latest generation of gene 
therapies). 
356 Jallal, supra note 165; see also H.A. Daniel Lagassé et al., Recent Advances in (Therapeutic Protein) Drug 
Development, F1000Research (Feb. 7, 2017) (exemplifying the growing domains into which biologic research and 
applications are expanding). 
357 Supra, Part II.A. 
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well as exploring the advantages and drawbacks of license revocation with regard to biosimilar 
competition. 
 
A. THE NEED FOR CUMULATIVE REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRUG PATENT ECOSYSTEM 
 
As seen above, the current wave of patent expirations is different from the previous ones 
because it affects a type of drug that was relatively rare until the twenty-first century.358 In addition 
to their immediate applications and future promise, biologics come at a price tag significantly 
higher than that of conventional drugs. Some commentators have observed that the price savings 
attributable to biosimilar competition are more “modest” than those triggered by generic 
competition in the conventional drug space.359 Generic versions of conventional drugs translate 
into savings in the 80% range, both in the United States and Europe.360 Due to manufacturing 
constraints361 and costlier regulatory review when compared to generics,362 the European market363 
has registered savings in connection with the introduction of biosimilars that are relatively lower: 
one study estimated average saving across European Union countries at around 25%.364 
While this is a relevant component of the economics of biosimilar competition, an 
important element is missing from this analysis: aggregate savings from biosimilars are not 
insignificant. Even when taking only into account the average biosimilar discount in the European 
market, saving a quarter of the price of a biologic is not negligible from the perspective of patients, 
insurers and health systems. Moreover, as seen in the case of Humira, in some cases biosimilar 
competition has triggered discounts of as little as 10% and as high as 80% in different European 
countries.365 Bearing in mind that Humira has a price tag of $38,000 per year after rebates,366 the 
positive social welfare impact of actual biosimilar competition in the United States market should 
not be minimized. As a report from the FTC has put it  
[a]lthough not as steep a discount as small-molecule generic 
drugs, a 10 to 30 percent discount on a $48,000 drug product 
represents substantial consumer savings.367 
                                                        
358 Haydon, Biologics: The Pricey Drugs Transforming Medicine, supra note 10. 
359 Price & Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, supra note 9, at 1028 (referencing 
data from the European market). 
360 See Matthew Solan, Buying into Generic Drugs, HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Jul. 25, 2016). See also Panos Kanavos, 
Do Generics Offer Significant Savings to the U.K. National Health Service?, 23 CURR. MED. RES. OPIN. 103 (2007) 
(reporting savings on selected generics exceeding the 90% threshold in the United Kingdom).  
361 Price & Rai, supra note 9, at 1028. 
362 Henry G. Grabowski et al., Regulatory and Cost Barriers Are Likely to Limit Biosimilar Development And 
Expected Savings In The Near Future, HEALTH AFF. (2004). 
363 The European market is widely seen as the “global pioneer” in the introduction of biosimilars, which is why it 
often used as the benchmark in this field. See Cécile Rémuzat et al., Key Drivers for Market Penetration of 
Biosimilars in Europe, 5 J. MARKET ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1, 1 (2017). 
364 Francis Mergelin et al, Biosimilars and the European Experience: Implications for the United States, 32 HEALTH 
AFF. 1803 (2013). 
365 Supra, note 279. 
366 Or close to $50,000 if there are no rebates. Supra, Part III.A. 
367 See EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES, supra note 209, at v. 
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In addition to differences related to the economics of biosimilar competition, the current 
landscape is also distinctive because patent thickets have grown worse.368 The case study on 
Humira does not portray an isolated phenomenon. Data show that the manufacturers of the eight 
largest-grossing biologics in the United States applied for an average of 151 patents related to the 
biologic, with 80% of the applications occurring after FDA licensure.369 The numbers also indicate 
that the average length for which these companies estimate to be able to exclude biosimilar 
competitors is 40 years, with actual periods varying between 31 and 48 years.370 The higher end 
of these estimates significantly outlasts the 20 years of patent protection and 12 of regulatory 
exclusivity contemplated in the patent and FDA statutes.371  
The problems triggered by pay-for-delay today thus exceed the domain of a single branch 
of law. Because they raise anticompetitive concerns, they can be configured as core antitrust 
problems.372 But that does not mean that antitrust law and antitrust regulators are the sole entities 
capable of addressing behaviors that unduly distort markets for pharmaceuticals.373 FDA law and 
patent law are intertwined with antitrust law in the biopharmaceutical arena.374 Monitoring pay-
for-delay deals involving biosimilars should not be an activity restricted to the FTC. The string of 
settlements surrounding biosimilars to Humira suggests that Actavis’ deterrent power is, in some 
circumstances, limited. Against this backdrop, the public interest would be furthered if additional 
agencies could add to the FTC’s patrolling functions.  
The Article thus argues in favor of cumulative ex post interventions from different 
agencies, and proceeds to illustrate how one such intervention could and should take place. It 
focuses primarily on the FDA as the gatekeeper of market entrance for biopharmaceutical 
products. It proposes a regime of license revocation for manufacturers who deliberately fail to 
bring their biosimilars to market after FDA approval. Such a solution eliminates the most 
troublesome effects of the extended lag between anticompetitive settlements and antitrust litigation 
and, in so doing, triages the marketplace for biosimilar competition. 
 
B. FDA AS A LOCUS FOR ADDRESSING COMPETITION ISSUES 
 
                                                        
368 See James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies , SSRN (2003), at 1 (describing 
the emergence of patent thickets), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=327760. 
369 See infra, note 242, at 2. 
370 Id., ib. 
371 The two terms are unlikely to occur in linear succession, and the actual patent term itself is often shorter for 
biopharmaceuticals. See Erika Lietzan & Kristina M.L. Acri, Distorted Drug Patents, __ WASH. L. REV __ 
(forthcoming 2020) (showing that, even after patent term restoration, the effective life of patents covering 
pharmaceuticals is often shorter than 14 years). 
372 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going, 3 ANTITRUST L. 
J. 749, 749 (2011) (noting that primary purpose of antitrust law is to promote competition). 
373 See e.g. Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & 
PRAC. 131, 131-132 (2018) (noting that antitrust laws and regulators constitute only one tool in the American anti-
monopoly legal and institutional framework). 
374 Carrier and Minniti, supra note 12. See also Jordan Paradise, Regulatory Silence at the FDA: Impact on Access 
and Innovation, 102 MINN. L. REV 2383, 2384 (fleshing out the relationship between the FDA’s regulatory activity 
and patent law). 
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Our collective understanding of the FDA changed considerably in the early twenty-first 
century, as work by Rebecca Eisenberg375 and other scholars 376 progressively shed light on the 
nuances of the role(s) played by the Agency as a regulator of pharmaceutical products. No longer 
regarded purely as a gatekeeper for safe and effective drugs, the FDA is now understood as a major 
catalyst for the production of information about the products it regulates.377 As Amy Kapczynski 
has put it, the “core function” of the Agency in this field is to generate and validate “high-quality 
information about medicines.”378 
One aspect of the Agency’s programmatic design that remains underexplored is the 
position of the FDA as a distorter of competition. The ways in which FDA’s actions affect 
competition have been primarily associated with the incentives package embedded in FDA law 
that is available to biopharmaceutical innovators and worthy follow-on innovators. The bulk of 
these incentives consists of market exclusivities that vary according to the FDA-approved 
product379 and that translate into delays or prohibitions on the approval of competitor products for 
a certain period of time.380 More recently, the FDA has been directed to award priority review 
vouchers following the approval of drugs targeting selected diseases,381 as a way to incentivize 
R&D in traditionally underfunded areas.382 
The consequences of these incentives administered by the FDA bear a direct impact on 
competition outcomes. Most notably, the exclusivity regime gives drug manufacturers the ability 
to enter the market as monopoly-like players, even in the absence of patent protection. At a 
different level, priority vouchers shorten the timeline for regulatory review, thus allowing the 
bearer to enter the market earlier than under standard review. 
Even though the FDA yields significant competition-distorting power, so far the Agency 
has not been regarded as a potential corrective locus when malfunctions arise in the context of 
biopharmaceutical competition. Yet, it is worth considering the FDA as an institutional player with 
the capability to address certain anticompetitive behaviors. The Agency is well positioned to curb 
                                                        
375 See Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra, note 54. 
376 See Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in Information Production, Past and Future, 102 
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Law: Cases and Materials, 4th ed. 
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379 See 21 C.F.R. 314.108, 316.31, 316.34; see also sections 505A, 505E, 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) and section 
505(j)(5)(B)(v) of the FDCA. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and 
Exclusivity (2018). 
380 Id., ib. 
381 See David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313 (2006) (first 
proposing an FDA-administered voucher system). 
382 For an overview and evaluation of the voucher program, see Ana Santos Rutschman, The Priority Review 
Voucher Program at the FDA: From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st Century Cures Act, 26 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 71 (2017). 
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excesses that distort competition, as a counterpart to its own power to distort competition through 
the grant of exclusivities and vouchers. 
The solution developed in the following section—license revocation—can be seen, among 
other features, as a punitive gesture directly aimed at curtailing anticompetitive behaviors like the 
ones embodied by pay-for-delay agreements. But it can also be seen as a corollary of the FDA’s 
gatekeeping function. The regulator that controls access to the market also exerts the faculty of 
restraining previously granted market access, if an approved product fails to meet statutory or 
regulatory standards while being commercialized. As such, the figure of revocation would not be 
extraneous to FDA practice, nor to its mandate as an administrative agency. Moreover, if the FDA 
were to play a more overt role in competition policy than it does today, with the purpose of 
disincentivizing behaviors like for pay-for-delay, this would be consistent with its public health-
oriented mission.383  
As far as biosimilars are concerned, the FDA itself has self-diagnosed the misalignment 
between FDA approval and market entrance.384 In mid-2018, the FDA Commissioner noted that, 
even though Agency had approved a total of nine biosimilars, only three were commercially 
available.385 As then-Commissioner Gottlieb put it, “[i]n some cases, patent thickets on biologics 
deter market entry for years after FDA approval.”386 
Pay-for-delay agreements between biologic and biosimilar manufacturers stem from a 
misarticulation of the leading regulatory regimes governing biopharmaceutical innovation—the 
patent system and the FDA regulatory regime, with antitrust scrutiny lagging in time. That a 
dysfunctional embodiment of the innovation ecosystem should allow grantees of FDA licenses to 
avoid commercialization through non-use is a perversion of the regulatory regime. In this context, 
FDA inaction in the face of non-practicing licensees amounts to a furtherance of an undesirable 
distortion to competition. 
The different functions performed by the FDA cannot be meaningfully isolated. While 
acting as an agency tasked with assessing and monitoring the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical 
products, the FDA is also acting as a catalyst for the production of valuable information, a promoter 
of public health and, often, a distorter of competition that grants market access to one manufacturer 
while delaying it for others. The competition-distorting role of the FDA in biopharmaceutical 
markets is not necessarily a negative thing.387 It is, first and foremost, a design feature. But this 
Article posits that, when certain disfunctions occur—namely, pay-for-delay—this feature should 
be balanced by a corrective gesture from the Agency, one that is already built into its regulatory 
framework.388 The FDA has long been given statutory power to revoke licenses.389 The final 
                                                        
383 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., What We Do (2018) (listing the ways in which the Agency pursues public health 
goals). 
384 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Advancing Patient Care Through Competition—Speech by Scott Gottlieb (Apr. 19, 
2018). 
385 Id., ib. 
386 Id., ib. 
387 Although some commentators have questioned whether lengthy exclusivity periods and priority vouchers really 
serve the purpose of promoting biopharmaceutical innovation. See e.g. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-
319, RARE DISEASES: TOO EARLY TO GAUGE EFFECTIVENESS OF FDA PEDIATRIC VOUCHER PROGRAM (Mar. 2, 
2016), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-319 (last accessed Jan. 9, 2020). 
388 Infra, Part IV.C.3 (outlining the regulatory framework for the revocation of FDA biologics licenses). 
389 See 21 C.F.R. § 601.5 (2018). 
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section of this Article argues that the FDA can use that power to revoke licenses granted to 
biosimilar manufacturers who fail to bring their products to market because of a pay-for-delay 
agreement. Moreover, the FDA should revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of pay-for-delay, 
because it is the best-placed institutional player in this field, as the PTO has limited power to break 
patent thickets and FTC scrutiny offers a direct but protracted response to anticompetitive behavior 
in the pharmaceutical arena. 
 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
 
This section proposes an ex post intervention aimed at curbing pay-for-delay in the context 
of biologic-biosimilar competition. Specifically, it argues that the FDA should use its power to 
revoke biosimilar licenses in cases of unjustified inaction by biosimilar manufacturers. Such an 
intervention, designed to occur on a faster timeline than antitrust scrutiny, functions as a deterrent 
for anticompetitive behaviors and creates a signaling mechanism that clears the field for legitimate 
competitors to emerge. 
 
1. The Proposed Intervention 
In its gatekeeping function, the FDA has the ability to grant licenses to market certain 
pharmaceutical drugs. As a general principle of FDA law, manufacturers of new pharmaceutical 
drugs, as well as follow-on innovators,390 are barred from bringing unapproved drugs to market, 
absent a permissive gesture from the FDA.391 The ability to grant licenses is matched by the 
Agency’s ability to revoke licenses, if certain behaviors—or lack thereof—occur.392 
As seen above, certain licenses granted by the FDA cause significant market distortions.393 
This is the case of licenses to market biological products, particularly when a biologic is the first 
of its kind to receive FDA approval and a statutory exclusivity prevents competitors from entering 
the market for a period of 12 years, independently of the status of patent protection. 
So far, the FDA has been engaging in license revocation primarily while exercising its 
gatekeeping role394 in pursuit of its mission of protecting the public health,395 but it has not done 
so in connection with its role in distorting competition. This Article argues that the Agency can 
and should revoke licenses granted to biosimilar manufacturers when they fail to bring their 
products to market within a certain period of time,396 and absent a reasonable justification for the 
delay, defined to mean circumstances that roughly align with the concepts of impracticability, 
impossibility or force majeure.397  
                                                        
390 An expression that encompasses manufacturers of generics drugs and of biosimilars alike. 
391 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(b) (prohibiting the introduction of new drugs into interstate commerce unless the FDA 
approves an application); 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)(j) (subjecting generic drugs to a similar prohibition and to the approval 
of an abbreviated application). See also Id. § 355(a) (framing the prohibition as one of “introduce or deliver for 
introduction into interstate commerce”). 
392 21 C.F.R. § 601.5. 
393 Supra, Part IV.B. 
394 And, indirectly, as per its information-producing role. 
395 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT WE DO, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do (last accessed Jan. 9, 
2020). 
396 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(2). 
397 Infra, Part IV.C.2. 
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As developed below, this proposal seeks to accomplish four goals. First, it provides a direct 
fix for a gamesmanship problem within overlapping regulatory regimes.398 Second, it seeks to 
mitigate the consequences399 of a problem that originates elsewhere in the administrative state, as 
dozens or hundreds of patents are awarded to a single biologic, enabling tiered litigation 
strategies.400 Third, it creates a signaling feature, as biosimilar manufacturers seeking FDA 
approval indicate that they are prepared to either see patent litigation through, or avoid existing 
patents altogether—as entering into a settlement with the manufacturer of the reference biologic 
will translate into losing their license.401 And fourth, it restores meaning to the licensing activity 
of the FDA, which has been stripped of its intended function as two-thirds of the first nine 
biosimilars approved by the Agency have not entered the market.402 
The proposal is confined to cases of pay-for-delay involving biosimilars, given the 
particular characteristics of competition in this field, as well as the costs to patients and health 
systems affected by the unavailability of biosimilar alternatives in the United States market. It is 
not proposed in lieu of antitrust scrutiny, but rather as a checkpoint for a specific type of 
anticompetitive behavior located outside the core antitrust avenues for patrolling heterogenous 
anticompetitive behaviors. And, finally, the proposal does not address the larger problems of 
regulatory design and interagency coordination of which pharmaceutical pay-for-delay agreements 
take advantage, but provides a localized fix designed to diminish the frequency and impact of these 
agreements.  
 
2. Mechanics and Implementation of the Proposal 
If subjected to the possibility of license revocation, manufacturers of biosimilars receiving 
approval from the FDA would have a certain period of time to start manufacturing their products 
and to bring them to market. Past that period, and absent a reasonable justification, the FDA would 
take steps to revoke the biosimilar license. 
FDA approval normally marks the last regulatory hurdle to commercialization of products 
subject to pre-market review. Because of the distortions to the post-approval timeline that are now 
pervasive in the case of biosimilars, this proposal advocates for the determination of a reasonable 
period of time for the license grantee to bring the biosimilar to market.403 The semi-formalized 
qualification comes from the fact that this period of time should be established by FDA guidance, 
                                                        
398 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687 
(2009) (defining regulatory gaming as “private behavior that harnesses procompetitive or neutral regulations and 
uses them for exclusionary purposes”). 
399 See Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, GEO. L. J. 1483, 1485-1486 (2015) (listing instances of direct and 
indirect action by non-patent agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission and the National Institutes of 
Health, in cases involving patent conflicts); see also W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, How Logically Impossible 
Patents Block Biosimilars, 37 NATURE BIOTECH. 862 (2019). 
400 Supra, Part III.A.2. 
401 Infra, Part IV.C.3. 
402 See supra note 202; see also Appendix 2. 
403 This idea is consistent with existing regulations, which contemplate a “reasonable” period during which the 
manufacturer of a biologic can “demonstrate or achieve compliance” before license revocation. 21 C.F.R. § 
601.5(b)(2) (2018). See also infra, Part IV.C.3. 
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an “informal tool”404 widely used by administrative agencies. The FDA, like other federal 
regulatory agencies, uses guidance “to set policy broadly and prospectively” instead of resorting 
to formal rulemaking processes.405 In the case of biosimilar licenses, issuing guidance would be 
the most flexible and least cumbersome way for the Agency to communicate with industry, 
affording interested parties and the public in general the possibility of commenting on draft 
versions.406 Moreover, and if appropriate, the malleability of guidance would allow the FDA to set 
different timelines and specifications for different types of biosimilars, as well as to move from 
general timeline parameters to more precise formulations (and vice-versa) as needed. 
This Article is agnostic as to the specific duration of this period of time. Such a 
determination is best left to the regulator with expertise in the field. The relevant element is that 
the establishment of a non-arbitrary deadline for commercialization of an approved biosimilar 
clearly conveys the expectations of the Agency to manufacturers. At the same time, it keeps the 
FDA involved in the indirect monitoring of competition outcomes: if the clock runs out and no 
reasonable justification is provided, then the Agency would revoke the biosimilar license. 
Revocation would occur according to the general administrative rules governing FDA 
actions, which are further detailed in the following sub-section. It would be nonetheless possible 
for a biosimilar manufacturer to show evidence that a delay is attributable to exogenous 
circumstances and therefore obtain a revised deadline from the Agency.407 The FDA has the ability 
to develop a framework contemplating “reasonable delays” through guidance. Because the 
manufacturing of biological products is significantly more complex than the manufacturing of 
conventional drugs,408 a natural fit for this category would be unforeseen issues affecting the 
manufacturing process. Additionally, guidance could contemplate other factors, ranging from 
production delays attributable to third-party actions to force majeure events. Absent a reasonable 
justification for the delay, the FDA would proceed to revoke the license.  
There are different possible embodiments of this proposal. In its simplest form, revocation 
would be a stand-alone measure. The following sub-section makes the case that the FDA currently 
has the authority to revoke biosimilar licenses based on the manufacturer’s failure to bring the 
licensed product to market.409 In more stringent versions of the proposal, which would require 
regulatory or legislative intervention—and which therefore would be more challenging410 to 
implement—revocation could be coupled with a time ban on reapplying for a license, or 
restrictions on data resubmission. 
 
                                                        
404 Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1 (2010); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and 
Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L REV. 397, 398 (2007) (noting that the amount of guidance issued by 
federal regulatory agencies is “massive”). 
405 Mendelson, id., at 397. 
406 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Guide to Submitting Comments to the FDA (2018). 
407 This is consistent with longstanding regulations governing revocation of licenses for biologic products. These 
regulations require, inter alia, a “reasonable” notification period during which the manufacturer can “demonstrate or 
achieve compliance’ with regulatory requirements before the FDA institutes revocation proceedings. 21 C.F.R. § 
601.5(b)(2) (2018). See also infra, Part IV.C.3. 
408 Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers, supra note XX, at 1033-1036 (highlighting path-dependency and 
unexpected physiological effects arising in connection with the manufacturing process). 
409 This authority is grounded on regulatory language; see 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(1)(a)(ii). 
410 Infra, Part IV.C.5. 
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3. The Possibility of License Revocation by the FDA 
As an administrative agency, the FDA is subject to general administrative principles and 
rules. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) gives agencies the ability to grant different types 
of licenses, which are collectively defined as including “the whole or a part of an agency permit, 
certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of 
permission.”411 The APA also contemplates several measures that can be taken by administrative 
agencies to penalize license holders for certain behaviors.412 These measures range from the 
imposition of economic sanctions such as fines413 to the invalidation of previously granted 
licenses.414  
The FDA is also subject to a specific regulatory framework governing the revocation of 
licenses. Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which sets forth the general regulatory 
framework for FDA-regulated products, addresses the possibility of license revocation in 
connection with different scenarios.415 These depend on the product at stake, as well as on the 
underlying causes of revocation. 
With regard to biologics, the circumstances under which the FDA may revoke a license 
fall broadly into four categories.416 First, license revocation may occur in cases in which the 
Agency is notified of a manufacturer’s intention to discontinue the manufacture of all or some of 
the products covered by a license.417 Second, the FDA has the authority418 to take steps to revoke 
a license when certain behaviors from the manufacturer effectively undermine the Agency’s ability 
to carry out inspections or to monitor changes affecting licensed products.419 Third, the Agency 
has the authority to revoke a license in connection with material violations of licensing standards, 
a category that includes significant changes involving a licensed product, methods of 
manufacturing or the manufacturing establishment, as well as notification failures. 420 Lastly, 
license revocation may also occur when the licensed product can no longer be considered safe or 
efficacious, or is deemed misbranded.421 
                                                        
411 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(8); see also id. § 551(1)(9) (defining licensing as including “agency process respecting the 
grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or 
conditioning of a license”). 
412 5 U.S.C. § 558 (generally subjecting these measures to jurisdictional and procedural limitations). 
413 Id. and 5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (listing the types of sanctions susceptible of being imposed by administrative 
agencies). 
414 5 U.S.C. § 558(c).  
415 21 C.F.R. § 601.5 (2018). See also 21 U.S.C. § 371 and 21 C.F.R. § 10 (2018) (delineating the general 
framework for the Agency’s administrative practices and procedures). 
416 Id. C.F.R. § 601.5 (2018). 
417 Id. C.F.R. § 601.5(a) (2018). 
418 Id. C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1) (2018) (framing revocation as a mandatory under certain circumstances: “The 
Commissioner shall notify the licensed manufacturer of the intention to revoke the biologics license (…) if the 
Commissioner finds any of the following (…)” [italics added]). 
419 Id. C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1)(i-ii) (2018). 
420 Id. C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1)(iii-iv) (2018). 
421 Id. C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1)(v-vi) (2018) (this category includes cases in which changes affecting the licensed 
product are so substantial that a new regulatory review is needed). 
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The regulations further establish the procedural framework for revocation of FDA licenses, 
which impose several obligations on the Agency, from notification and hearing requirements422 to 
the concession of a “reasonable period” for manufacturers to demonstrate compliance or bring 
their practices into compliance.423  
In cases of pay-for-delay, licensure is followed by prolonged inaction on the part of the 
biosimilar manufacturer. From an administrative policy perspective, this behavior is undesirable, 
as it frustrates the purpose for which the license was granted while displacing resources within an 
agency. In the case of the FDA, the failure to bring an approved biosimilar to market additionally 
weakens the catalyzing role of the Agency in the production of information. A normal licensure 
procedure culminates in the commercialization of a biopharmaceutical drug, maintaining the flow 
of data production as the drug is monitored throughout the post-market stage through surveillance 
studies and reporting requirements. Under pay-for-delay, that flow is broken. The permission 
granted by the FDA is not reciprocated by continued production of data, but rather followed by 
stagnating levels of information about the approved product. Adding to this problem, the outcome 
of the licensure process is at odds with the time and resources allocated by the FDA during the 
review process: the FDA grants a permission that is not acted upon. For an agency that has recently 
made some important strides in diminishing application backlog, and which can easily be affected 
by external constraints,424 the mismatch between the resource allocation and frustrated market 
entrance is not insignificant. 
The language of the revocation provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations can be used 
to support the view that the FDA can revoke a license due to inaction on the part of the biosimilar 
manufacturer, coupled with the ensuing lack of information generated about an FDA-approved 
product. § 601.5(b)(1)(ii) authorizes the FDA to initiate proceedings to revoke a biologics license 
when “[m]anufacturing of products or of a product has been discontinued to an extent that a 
meaningful inspection or evaluation cannot be made.” This provision is one of several in which 
license revocation constitutes a remedy to manufacturing insufficiencies. § 601.5(b)(1)(ii) 
specifically addresses cases in which manufacturing activity has been reduced to inordinately low 
levels, which consequently and similarly decreases the production of information about the 
licensed product. The unusual and quasi-oxymoronic word choice—“discontinued to an extent”— 
seems to indicate that the law is contemplating situations in which manufacturing outputs are 
virtually zero. Discontinued production is a different concept from very low levels of 
production,425 but the language appears to imply the admissibility of a range of discontinuation—
or, more properly, of reduced levels of production—for which license revocation becomes the 
remedy if production does not rise to meaningful levels.426 As such, the language indicates that the 
primary concern of the regulator is to avoid situations in which manufacturing for the United States 
market of an FDA-approved biologic falls to zero, or to levels that are materially equivalent to 
zero. 
                                                        
422 Id. C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(1) (2018). 
423 Id. C.F.R. § 601.2 (2018). 
424 See e.g. Alexander Gaffney, Post-Shutdown, FDA Faces Backlog of Work, PWC (Feb. 1, 2019) (noting the 
impact of the 2019 government shutdown on the Agency’s review timeline). 
425 Common definitions of “discontinued” equate it with “to break continuity,” “cease to operate, administer, use, 
produce, or take,” “abandon or terminate.” Merriam-Webster (2019).  
426 Cfr. 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(2) (giving manufacturers a “reasonable period” to “demonstrate or achieve 
compliance”). 
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The framing provision in § 601.5(b)(1), to which the discontinuation provision is subject, 
states that the Agency “shall notify the licensed manufacturer of the intention to revoke the 
biologics license.” The enabling language in this section is thus mandatory. Not only can the FDA 
revoke licenses in situations within the purview of § 601.5(b)(1)(ii), it should do so. 
The articulation of these two provisions provides a framework through which the Agency 
addresses situations of inexistent or quasi-inexistent manufacturing levels. If the regulator 
mandates license revocation in cases in which manufacturing levels are close to “discontinuation,” 
then the revocation framework has to contemplate cases in which manufacturing levels are zero or 
have never risen above zero. A logical interpretive principle of a maiore ad minus should apply 
here: if the law has a punitive gesture towards levels of productions that are materially equivalent 
to zero, then it must also encompass situations in which manufacturing levels have never been 
greater that zero. What happens in situations of pay-for-delay falls squarely under this framework: 
inaction at the manufacturing level, with consequent unavailability of the FDA-approved product 
in the market, in disregard of the licensure process. 
A contextual analysis further enhances this reading. The interpretation of the regulations 
offered above is consistent with the spirit of § 601.5(a), which mandates license revocation (“[a] 
biologics license shall be revoked”) whenever the manufacturer of an approved biologic notifies 
the FDA of its intention to discontinue production of an approved product.427 If a manufacturer 
chooses (or is forced) to bring levels of production down to zero, the justification for the 
maintenance of the license ceases to exist.  
In addition to establishing the framework for license revocation, it is worth noting that § 
601.5 also contains a balancing mechanism, giving manufacturers the opportunity to bring 
production levels to a meaningful threshold within a “reasonable period” of time.428 The proposal 
outlined in the previous section of this Article put forward an explicit embodiment of this 
requirement,429 developed through guidance.430 
The FDA should thus revoke the licenses of biosimilar manufacturers engaging in pay-for-
delay after a reasonable period of time. If applied properly, the existing regulatory framework 
should have resulted in the revocation of the licenses of Humira competitors who gained FDA 
approval but failed to manufacture the approved biosimilar,431 or in a nudge towards compliance 
with manufacturing requirements.432 
 
4. Advantages of the Proposal 
In addition to applying the existing legal framework for license revocation in a manner that 
is consistent with linguistic and teleological interpretive principles, the proposal outlined above 
serves several other goals. 
                                                        
427 Id. § 601.5(a) (2018). 
428 Id. § 601.5(b)(2). 
429 But see i.d. § 601.5(b)(2) and § 601.6(a) (establishing that the “reasonable period” period requirement ceases to 
apply in cases in which the Agency reasonably believes that the public health is being harmed); id. § 601.5(b)(2) 
(doing the same “in cases involving willfulness”). 
430 Supra, Part IV.C.2. 
431 The existence of a pay-for-delay agreement should constitute prima facie evidence of violation of the conduct 
required by 21 C.F.R. § 601.5(b)(ii) and § 601.5(b)(2). 
432 Part IV.C.5 further explores the advantages of license removal as a nudge mechanism. 
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First, it constitutes an indirect but more timely response to anticompetitive behaviors than 
the one normally provided by institutions that directly monitor antitrust issues. Consider, for 
instance, the case of Amgen, the first biosimilar company to settle with AbbVie.433 The FDA 
approved Amgen’s biosimilar in September 2016, just over three months before the expiration of 
Humira’s composition patent.434 The pay-for-delay settlement took place in September 2017.435 
As of early 2020, Amgen’s license is still valid, even though no manufacturing for the United 
States market has occurred. Now imagine that the reasonable period granted by the FDA was one 
year, counted from January 1, 2017.436 Assuming no significant hurdles to manufacturing during 
that period,437 license revocation would have occurred in early 2018. Even if, for the sake of the 
argument, the reasonable period were fixed at two years, revocation would occur in early 2019, 
months before the beginning of the antitrust response. Even though these dates are artificial, they 
illustrate the ability of the FDA to address, albeit indirectly, a competition-related problem. 
License revocation is a nimbler tool than direct antitrust responses to pay-for-delay. 
The second advantage of the solution proposed in this Article is its signaling function. 
Were the FDA to apply the existing revocation framework to pay-for-delay, a biosimilar company 
seeking regulatory approval would be signaling to competitors its intention to see the licensure 
process through. This signal would be especially meaningful in the case of patent challenges, as it 
would indicate confidence in the probability of success of the challenge. Moreover, in versions of 
the proposal encompassing additional measures—such as a temporal ban on reapplication for a 
license—the signaling function would be even stronger. 
As the following sub-section acknowledges, license revocation may have a chilling effect 
on the number of biosimilar manufacturers seeking FDA approval, particularly when several 
secondary patents on a biologic are valid or have yet to be invalidated. But the third effect of the 
proposal is that it may nudge some biosimilar manufacturers to channel resources towards 
challenging weak patents in the biopharmaceutical space. While the overall number of biosimilar 
manufacturers seeking market entrance may be smaller under the threat of license revocation, the 
number of follow-on competitors needed on the market for prices to drop is actually fairly small.438 
As further detailed below, market saturation happens quickly in this field,439 and therefore even if 
the overall number of potential market entrants is lower under the proposed framework, the number 
of manufacturers who need to be able to navigate R&D, regulatory review and potential patent 
litigation, remains very low. At the same time, the economic return available for those few who 
succeed in entering the market is not negligible. As such, even if the proposal may lead to a certain 
degree of R&D attrition, the economic incentive to come to market is not displaced. License 
revocation eliminates pay-for-delay and clears the field for highly motivated players to seek 
product commercialization, potentially even sooner than under current practices. 
Finally, another angle of this proposal is that it restores meaning to the licensing activity 
of the FDA. By leaving manufacturing inaction unpenalized in the short term, an empty space at 
the intersection of different branches of the law allows companies to seek and obtain FDA approval 
                                                        
433 See Appendix 2. 
434 Id. 
435 Id. 
436 The first day after the expiration of the composition patent on Humira, for the sake of simplicity. 
437 As there have not been any in the manufacturing of the biosimilar for the European market. 
438 See Davio, Momenta Drops Biosimilar Adalimumab from Pipeline, supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
439 Infra, Part IV.C 5. 
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without any intention of entering the market for years.440 As such, FDA licensure is reduced to 
empty gesture. For an agency that is now staunchly embedded in biopharmaceutical innovation 
policy, this is especially problematic. 
 
5. Drawbacks of the Proposal 
A feature of this proposal is that it specifically targets only one of the parties engaging in 
anticompetitive behavior. If implemented, were a Humira-type deal to occur, AbbVie would not 
be directly affected by the intervention of the FDA, whereas Amgen and any other biosimilar 
companies entering into pay-for-delay agreements would. In stronger versions of the proposal, 
there is a punitive element added to license revocation—for instance, in the form of a temporal 
ban on seeking regulatory approval—that further renders the proposal harsher towards follow-on 
competitors. 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that even stronger versions of the proposal target 
biosimilar manufacturers only if and because their status switches from would-be competitors to 
gamers of the regulatory system. While a symmetrical framework would be formally fairer in 
absolute terms, it would be impracticable from the perspective of co-involving the FDA in 
addressing pay-for-delay. License revocation grounded in manufacturer inaction does not apply to 
the first-comer to market, but to follow-on innovators who fail to compete. AbbVie’s behavior is 
problematic from different angles, chief among which antitrust law, but not in terms of meeting 
the manufacturing requirements that attach to the grant of an FDA license. Beyond this technical 
aspect, as a matter of policy, the goal of the proposal is to bring follow-on products to market 
sooner, not to diminish the influx of life-changing and life-savings drugs to market. Moreover, and 
as a balancing mechanism, the party not targeted by the FDA intervention under the proposed 
framework is not exempted from legal scrutiny: it merely happens at a different time and through 
the lens of a different branch of the law. 
A different type of objection to the proposal relates to the political economy. As Daniel 
Carpenter has recently observed, the FDA operates within “an inescapable political world.”441 In 
terms of implementation, the previous sub-section delineated a pathway for application of the 
existing license revocation framework to pay-for-delay. In its most straightforward form, the 
proposal does not require legislative intervention and is entirely FDA-administered. But legislative 
action would likely be required to adopt more expansive forms of the proposal. Given the fact that 
topics related to biopharmaceuticals are at the center of some of the most politically charged 
debates in the United States, this is not a trivial drawback. While this issue does not present itself 
solely in connection with this proposal, it certainly decreases the likelihood that stronger versions 
of the proposal will be adopted. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that currently there are efforts 
across the political spectrum supporting a variety of measures aimed at lowering the price of 
prescription drugs.442 As a tool to bring biosimilars to market faster, even stronger versions of the 
                                                        
440 Supra, Part III (describing licensure of biosimilars to Humira in cases in which the sponsor of the biosimilar had 
previously entered into an anticompetitive agreement with Humira’s manufacturer). 
441 Daniel Carpenter, FDA Transparency in an Inescapable Political World, 45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 29 (2017). 
442 See e.g. Susan Cornwell & Michael Erman, Senators Announce Bipartisan Proposal to Lower Drug Prices, 
REUTERS (Jul. 23, 2019); Michael Erman & Carl O’Donnell, White House Preparing Order That Would Cut Drug 
Prices for Medicare, REUTERS (Jul. 24, 2019); Susan Cornwell, U.S. Speaker Pelosi Unveils Drug Price Plan, 
Trump Welcomes It, REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2019). It is also worth noting that the FTC supports legislation to curb pay-
for-delay. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: WHEN DRUG COMPANIES AGREE NOT TO COMPETE, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay. 
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license revocation proposal are consistent with these goals, despite the need for changes to the law 
and regulations. 
Another dimension of the political economy is that the FDA derives a substantial amount 
of its funding from industry. In fiscal year 2018, for example, the overall budget of the Agency 
was $5.4 billion, of which 55% ($3 billion) derived from federal budget authorization and 45% 
($2.4 billion) came from industry user fees.443 While being mindful of this feature and of the fact 
that the FDA interacts constantly with industry,444 the proposal does not fundamentally upend the 
FDA-industry relationship. Instead, its core advocates for the application of existing law. As a by-
product, a relatively small number of firms would be affected by license revocation or the threat 
thereof.445 From this perspective, the proposal might be more palatable to the pharmaceutical 
industry as a whole than at first blush. Additionally, and more importantly, disruption of the status 
quo should not be a valid justification for the Agency to shy away from fulfilling its role in license 
revocation, or for possible legislative changes to be summarily discounted.  
Finally, revisiting the problem of chilling effects outlined in the previous sub-section, it is 
entirely possible that fewer biosimilar companies would seek regulatory approval under a system 
in which license revocation looms as a response to pay-for-delay. Nevertheless, given the size of 
the market for biologics, the incentive to become the second or third market entrant remains in 
place. In fact, given the costs associated with developing and manufacturing biosimilar products, 
one of the early lessons in the economics of biosimilar competition has been that the number of 
follow-on innovators able to enter the market until returns become sub-competitive is small. Once 
again, the case of Humira illustrates this point: between September 2017 and May 2019, nine 
biosimilar companies entered into pay-for-delay agreements with AbbVie;446 in August 2019, 
Momenta, a company that was developing a biosimilar to Humira, announced that it would stop 
R&D on the project and reallocate around $100 million to the development of a different 
biosimilar.447 The company explicitly credited market saturation in the Humira biosimilar space 
as one of the main reasons for the switch.448 Against this backdrop, while the proposed FDA 
intervention would diminish competition from a quantitative perspective, the possibility of tapping 
into multi-million dollar revenue streams should be sufficient to preserve enough economic 
incentives for a limited number of follow-on firms to seek market entrance.  
Throughout its evolution as a public-health oriented agency, the FDA has acquired 
innovation-promoting and competition-distorting power, while retaining its mission of promoting 
and maintaining the public health. A solution that preserves the goal of bringing motivated 
biosimilar manufacturers to come to market—and, as a consequence, the indirect goal of lowering 
prices of the most promising and expensive drugs available to patients—is ultimately consistent 
with these goals. 
 
                                                        
443 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA AT A GLANCE (2018). 
444 Robert M. Califf, Transparency at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 24, 24-25 
(2017). 
445 One of the consequences of the asymmetrical nature of the proposal is that there would also be less disruption of 
the status quo for big pharma than under other proposals targeting anticompetitive behaviors or high drug of 
prescription drugs. 
446 See Appendix 2. 
447 See supra note 438 and accompanying text. 
448 See GABI, Momenta Drops Humira Biosimilar Development (Aug. 30, 2019). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As the world’s most expensive—and most needed—drugs begin losing patent protection 
in the United States, one would expect cheaper versions of these drugs to become available to 
patients. Yet, as seen above, that has not been the case, even when fully developed biosimilars 
have received FDA market approval.  
In addition to the behavior of private firms, exemplified above by the Humira case study, 
several imbalances rooted in seemingly unrelated parts of the administrative state contribute to this 
scenario. From the likely excessive number of patents issued by the PTO covering a single drug to 
the temporal lag problem inherent to antitrust scrutiny, it has been relatively easy for 
anticompetitive behaviors to proliferate and remain unchecked for extended periods of time, with 
potentially devastating consequences to the health of patients and at onerous costs to health 
systems.  
This Article has identified a new institutional locus for more timely interventions seeking 
to address these types of anticompetitive behaviors. As a pre-market gatekeeper with post-market 
monitoring functions, as well as in its role as a catalyst for the production of information, the FDA 
is well positioned to both penalize and disincentivize gamesmanship of the regulatory system in 
the area of biologic-biosimilar competition, while clearing the pathway for motivated players to 
bring cheaper drugs to market. The Article has further argued that the proposed solution—license 
revocation—is already supported by existing regulatory language, even if not by agency practice. 
Alternative embodiments of a license revocation-based scheme are also possible, including 
interventions by regulators or legislators that would direct the Agency to start applying the existing 
revocation provisions to ongoing cases. 
Finally, and beyond features which are specific to the field of biopharmaceutical products, 
the Article has sought to call attention to a less-explored dimension of FDA activity: in addition 
to its canonical functions, the FDA should also be understood as a distorter of competition, as 
illustrated by the multiple market exclusivity regimes it operates and its priority voucher program. 
When considered in this light, the Agency should not be discounted as a possible player in the 
search for responses to competition-driven problems—a topic with larger ramifications across 
legal regimes worth exploring in future scholarly dialogue. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Humira’s Patent Estate 
 
Approved 
Indication 
Rheumatoid 
Arthritis 
Gastro 
Indications 
Psoriasis Psoriatic 
Arthritis 
Ankylosing 
Spondylitis 
Juvenile 
Idiopathic 
Arthritis 
Hidradenitis 
Suppurativa 
Composition 
of Matter Expired Dec. 31, 2016 
Indication / 
Method of 
Treatment 
4 patents 
Earliest 
Expiry: 
2022 
6 patents 
Earliest 
Expiry: 
2022 
3 
patents 
Earliest 
Expiry: 
2023 
4 
patents 
Earliest 
Expiry: 
2023 
3 patents 
Earliest 
Expiry: 
2022 
1 patent 
Expiry: 
2030 
1 patent 
Expiry: 
2031 
Formulation 14 Patents 
Expire 2022 – 2028 
Manufacturing 24 patents 
Expire 2027 – 2034 
Other (Device, 
Diagnostics, 
etc.) 
15 patents 
Expire 2024 – 2032 
 
Table 1: Adapted from Richard Gonzalez, AbbVie Long-Term Strategy, ABBVIE (Oct. 30, 2015) 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Chronology of Settlements between AbbVie and Biosimilar Companies 
 
 
Biosimilar Company Settlement Date Agreed Entry Date  
(U.S.) 
Biosimilar FDA 
Approval 
Amgen 9/ 28/2017 1/31/2023 9/23/2016 
Samsung Bioepis 4/5/2018 6/30/2023 7/23/2019 
Mylan 7/17/2018 7/31/2023 NA 
Sandoz 10/11/2018 9/30/2023 10/31/2018 
Fresenius Kabi 10/17/2018 9/30/2023 NA 
Momenta 11/6/2018 11/20/2023 NA 
Pfizer 11/30/2018 11/20/2023 NA 
Coherus 1/25/2019 12/15/2023 NA 
Boehringer Ingelheim 5/14/2019 7/1/2023 8/25/2017 
 
Table 2: Adapted from Zachary Brennan, Six Lawsuits Target AbbVie’s Humira and its Patent Thicket, RAPS (Apr. 2, 2019) 
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